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NEITHER TINKER, NOR HAZELWOOD, NOR FRASER, NOR
MORSE: WHY VIOLENT STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS
REPRESENT A UNIQUE FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
William C. Nevin*
In the first year after the April 20, 1999, shooting at Columbine High School in
Littleton, Colorado, scholars were quick to note the rush to censorship across the
country, including discipline for a high school newspaper columnist who suggested
satirically that assassinating the president would be a good stress reliever;1 the efforts
in Colorado, Georgia, New Mexico, and Tennessee to ban the style of trench coats
worn by the Columbine shooters;2 andironically enoughcases in Louisiana and
Texas involving administrators who attempted to prevent students from wearing black
armbands.3 It was simply, as Professor Clay Calvert wrote, a story of censorship.4
Two years after the shooting, the story was much the same as scholars noted a
drastic increase in expulsions and suspensions for behavior or speech . . . neither
criminal nor violent.5 The legal principles underlying this constrict[ion] of First
Amendment rights were not entirely apparent, as lawyer Edward T. Ramey wrote, but
it was expression that bore the brunt of many of the emotional aftershocks of the
Columbine attack6 because the fear of violence on a tragic scale gave administrators
* Instructor, journalismand speech at the UniversityofWest Alabama. B.A., 2007,Commu-
nication,UniversityofAlabama;J.D., 2010, UniversityofAlabama School ofLaw; Ph.D., 2014,
Communicationand InformationSciences, UniversityofAlabama. Aversion of this Articlewas
first published in the authors dissertation, Students, Violence, and Violent Student Speech: The
Preservation of First Amendment Rights in a Frightening Age. The author would like to thank
his committee for their guidance in preparing the dissertation, the editors of this journal for
their work in publishing this Article, and his wife Kate for her continued love and support.
1 ClayCalvert, Free Speech and Public Schools in a Post-Columbine World: Check Your
Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77 DENV.U.L.REV.739, 742 (2000) [herein-
after Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools].
2 Richard C. Demerle, Note, The New Scylla and Charybdis: Student Speech vs. Student
Safety After Columbine, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 428, 430 (2001).
3 David L. Hudson, Jr., Fear of Violence in Our Schools: Is Undifferentiated Fear in
the Age of Columbine Leading to a Suppression of Student Speech?, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 79,
7980 (2002); see also Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools, supra note 1, at 739 (detailing
the story of a Dallas, Texas high school student who wore an armband to mourn the students
killed at Columbine and later had to sue her school to protect her expressive rights and prevent
a three-day suspension from being noted in her transcript).
4 Calvert, Free Speech and Public Schools, supra note 1, at 740.
5 KathrynE. McIntyre,Note, HysteriaTrumps First Amendment: BalancingStudent Speech
with School Safety, 7 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 39, 41 (2002).
6 Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of Columbine,
77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 709 (2000).
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all the reasonslegitimate or illegitimatethey needed to trounce the First Amend-
ment rights of public school students, according to Professors Robert D. Richards
and Clay Calvert.7
After Columbine was followed by a 2005 school shooting in Red Lake, Minne-
sota, that killed five students, a teacher, and a security guard; the 2007 Virginia Tech
massacre that killed thirty-two people; the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary
School in Newtown, Connecticut, that killed twenty elementary school children and
six adults; and many other lower-profile school-related incidents (in addition to the
shootings in Tucson, Arizona, and Aurora, Colorado),8 the resulting media coverage
made it difficult for any fears of school violence to subsideeven if schools themselves
were getting safer.9 In short, much like the terror attacks of September 11, 2001,
7 Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U.L.REV. 1089, 1091 (2003); see, e.g., Kyle W.
Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public School Authority over Student
Cyberspeech through the Lens of Personal Jurisdiction, 92 MINN.L.REV. 1206, 1206 (2008)
([S]chool administrators lack a strong incentive to protect the free speech rights of their stu-
dentsthey are more concerned with preserving the integrity of the educational process
against perceived threats.); McIntyre, supra note 5, at 52 (School shootings have generated
a climate of fear, but that fear does not provide a rational basis for curtailing a students First
Amendment rights or excluding them from education.).
8 Timeline of Worldwide School and Mass Shootings: Gun-related Tragedies in the U.S.
and Around the World, INFOPLEASE.COM, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0777958.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2015).
9 See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 3, at 10304 (School advocates may well cite their
earnest desire to prevent anotherColumbine. . . . [B]ecause ofColumbine, Springfield, and other
incidents, school safety concerns trump free-speech rights. There are several problems with
this phenomenon. First, it is not at all clear that there has been a marked increase in school
violence. Some studies have shown the oppositethat school violence is on the decline. . . . Just
because the media reports on a subject does not necessarily mean that there is an increase in
that phenomenon. Oftentimes, our societyand particularly the mediaseize on certain
anomalous events and incorrectly report a disturbing trend.); Richard Salgado, Comment,
Protecting Student Speech Rights While Increasing School Safety: School Jurisdiction and
the Search for Warning Signs in a Post-Columbine/Red Lake Environment, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 1371, 139394 ([S]tatistically speaking, schools are among the safest places for children
to be. In any given year, a student is three to four times more likely to be hit by lightning than
to be the victim of violence in school. Yet an atmosphere of fear has become pervasive in the
nations schools. Fueled by media hype, fear of the unthinkable and, perhaps, a bit of guilt,
more parents are demanding that school boards implement strict policies to deal with kids
who step out of line. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); W. David Watkins
&John S. Hooks, TheLegal Aspects of SchoolViolence:BalancingSchool Safety with Students
Rights, 69 MISS. L.J. 641, 64445 (1999) ([T]he number of twelfth graders who reported
being injured by a weapon while at school did not increase significantly between 1976 and
1996. In fact, a recent study measuring trends in nonfatal violent behaviors among adolescents
in the United States between 1991 and 1997 indicates significant linear decreases in aggressive
behaviors such as fighting and carrying guns onto school property. A survey of principals of
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changed the way Americans view terrorism, Columbine and subsequent violent at-
tacks changed the way administrators and courts evaluate school safety and the free-
doms allotted to studentsespecially those students who express themselves with
violent imagery.10
Presumably under the guise of preventing future attacks, episodes of school vio-
lence can also prompt administrators to target student speech that expresses violent
themes.11 The 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, according to one expert in the area of stu-
dent speech, prompted a revival of a more aggressive stance toward violent student
speech as [s]chools are looking for and making up things out of statements that, in
the past, would have been passed over as foolish kid talk.12 Broadly speaking,
cases dealing with violent student speech can be separated into three categories:
violent expression related to pedagogy and classroom activities, violent expression
unrelated to pedagogy, and student speech that truly threatens others. This Article
will focus on the first of those categories: violent expression incorporated into a
childs education.
There is perhaps no better example of both violent expression related to peda-
gogy and the rush to punish violent student speech than the facts highlighted in Cuff
ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Central School District.13 In Cuff, a ten-year-old fifth-grade
student identified in court documents as B.C. was completing an assignment in
science class wherein he was to both color a drawing of an astronaut and write a
wish of anything he wanted on the spacemans leg.14 After a slew of questions
prompted the teacher to offer, When I mean anything you want, anything. You can
schools with seventy-five percent or more of the student population living in poverty, showed
significant reductions in the number of conflicts among students, in the use of drugs and alcohol
among students, and in physical or verbal abuse of teachers. Data from the National Crime
Victimization Survey for 1996 indicate that incidences of violent victimization among adoles-
cents are at their lowest levels since the survey instrument was revised in 1992. Despite recent
tragedies, homicides in school are extremely rare events. (footnotes omitted)); Angie Fox,
Note and Comment, Waiting to Exhale: How Bong Hits 4 Jesus Reduces Breathing Space
for Student Speakers & Alters the Constitutional Limits on Schools Disciplinary Actions
Against Student Threats in the Light of Morse v. Frederick, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 435
([R]esearch demonstrates that school violence in this country has steadily declined since the
early 1990s, when it peaked alongside other forms of juvenile crime.).
10 Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts: Stretching the
High Courts Ruling Too Far to Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 21
(2008) [hereinafter Calvert, Misuse and Abuse].
11 JudyWang, Sensitive Speech: High Schools React to Violent Expression After Virginia
Tech Massacre, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR. (Aug. 1, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.splc.org
/news/report_detail.asp?id=1365&edition=43.
12 Id. (quoting an interview with Mike Hiestand, a legal consultant for the Student Press
Law Center).
13 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012).
14 Id. at 111.
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write about missiles,15 B.C. decided to write his wish: Blow up the school with the
teachers in it.16
Many of his classmates laughed at B.C.s scribblings, but another was so con-
cerned that she told the science teacher what B.C. had written.17 The teacher found
little humor in the elementary students wish and sent him to the principals office.18
After meeting first with B.C. and then his parents, the principal decided to suspend
the student for a total of six days.19 B.C.s parents objected to his punishment and
sued the school district, alleging a violation of the childs First Amendment rights.20
The plaintiffs, however, found little redress as the school district was granted summary
judgment in federal district court, a decision upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In its decision, the Second Circuit made it clear courts should defer to school ad-
ministrators where violent speech is concerned: [I]n the context of student speech
favoring violent conduct, it is not for courts to determine how school officials should
respond. School administrators are in the best position to assess the potential for harm
and act accordingly.21 In deciding the case, the court focused on the Tinker22 stan-
dard, applying it as whether school officials might reasonably portend disruption
from the student expression at issue.23 The court also stressed that the standard was
objective, focusing on the reasonableness of the school administrations response.24
Yet in ultimately concluding that the administrations response was reasonable, the
court showed just how unreasonable and reactionary it was. The court noted that the
astronaut drawing caused one student to become very worried, but that was not
enough to meet the Tinker standard and justify the silencing of B.C.s expression.25
To do that, the court engaged in extended and elaborate speculation:
School administrators might reasonably fear that, if permitted,
other students might well be tempted to copy, or escalate, B.C.s
conduct. This might then have led to a substantial decrease in
15 Id. at 116 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 111. B.C. had been disciplined by teachers and school administrators for misbe-
havior in and around school before his drawing. Id. His previous misbehavior included two
similar incidents: a drawing depicting someone firing a gun and a story he wrote in fourth




19 Id. at 112 (noting that the students punishment included five days of off-campus sus-
pension and another day of in-school suspension).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 113.
22 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23 Cuff, 677 F.3d at 113 (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51 (2d Cir. 2008)).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 114.
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discipline, an increase in behavior distracting students and teach-
ers from the educational mission, and tendencies to violent acts.
Such a chain of events would be difficult to control because the
failure to discipline B.C. would give other students engaging in
such behavior an Equal Protection argument to add to their First
Amendment contentions. . . . A failure of the appellees to re-
spond forcefully to the wish might have led to a decline of
parental confidence in school safety with many negative effects,
including, e.g., the need to hire security personnel and even a
decline in enrollment.
Thus, appellees could reasonably have concluded that B.C.s
astronaut drawing would substantially disrupt the school envi-
ronment, and their resulting decision to suspend B.C. was consti-
tutional.26
According to the courts argument, if B.C.s drawing was not punished, other stu-
dents might copy his expression to such an extent that the student body would be both
distracted and prone to violent acts. Then, teachers and administrators would be
unable to control the school to such a degree that parents would lose faith in their abili-
ties, thereby resulting in decreased enrollment. The Second Circuits claims are so
speculative and so exaggerated that it might have gotten the same mileage out of simply
trying to pin the potential downfall of Western civilization on B.C.s crayon drawing.
This Article contends that violent student assignments represent a challenge not
adequately addressed in current case law. Under current Supreme Court student
speech jurisprudence, Tinker27 governs extracurricular student speech when it en-
croaches upon the grounds of the school, Fraser28 addresses sexually explicit student
speech, Hazelwood29 controls where the student speech implicates pedagogical
concerns and bears the sign of sponsorship from the school, and Morse30 enables a
school to act against a student speaker advocating the use of illegal drugs.31 There
is, however, a clear gap in the current framework when student speech is part of the
school curriculum yet it lacks any sign of the schools imprimatur.32 This speech is
exemplified by student assignments such as the crayon wish in Cuff 33 where student
expression is integrated into the curriculum but it lacks any real possibility of being
mistaken for official school speech. Without the schools imprimatur, such speech
26 Id. at 11415 (footnote omitted).
27 Tinker, 393 U.S. 503.
28 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
29 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
30 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
31 See infra Part I for a full discussion of the Supreme Courts student speech jurisprudence.
32 Hazelwood, 478 U.S. at 271.
33 Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2012).
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falls outside of the realm of Hazelwood, and yet it is still connected to curriculum,
therefore making it inappropriate to decide using Tinkers material and substantial
disruption analysis.
Thus this Article will both (1) explore a subset of violent student speech cases that
could rightly be considered under Hazelwood if only the student expression bore the
sign of official school sponsorship and (2) argue for the creation of a new standard
based on Hazelwood to govern non-sponsored curricular speech. Furthermore, this
new standard would operate much like the current Hazelwood analysis with one key
distinction: where student speech is curricular and non-sponsored in nature, the only
options available to school administrators would be those representing pedagogical
counter-speech. Punitive discipline, such as the suspension seen in Cuff, would not
be allowed under this new standard because it represents a corruption of the educa-
tion process and a fundamental unfairness to students whose only transgression was
to simply turn in an assignment or otherwise attempt to further their education.
Part I will detail Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence. Part II will examine
several violent non-sponsored curricular student speech cases, identifying common
fact patterns and tracing favored modes of analysis in lower courts. Part III will address
why current Supreme Court jurisprudence fails to adequately address these cases.
Part IV establishes the non-sponsored curricular speech standard by detailing its opera-
tion and examining the administrative options under the standard. The conclusion ap-
plies this standard to a selection of applicable cases.
I. SUPREME COURT STUDENT SPEECH JURISPRUDENCE
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
The Supreme Court began its substantive exploration in student speech with its
1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.34
In Tinker, school administrators learned of a plan formulated by students and local
adults to wear black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War.35 To prevent stu-
dents from doing so, area principals met and decided to institute a policy so that any
student with an armband would be first asked to remove it before being suspended.36
Three students wore armbands in violation of the policy, refused to remove them, and
were subsequently suspended.37 The fathers of the students then sued, seeking both
an injunction against further discipline and nominal damages.38 They found no relief
34 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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at the district court level, however, as the court upheld the actions of the administra-
tors as constitutional in light of their responsibilities to maintain school discipline.39
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit split equally in an en banc
decision, thereby affirming the lower courts decision in favor of the school district.40
Simply stated, the issue before the Supreme Court in Tinker was a matter of de-
termining who wins when the free expression rights of students collide with the rules
of school officials.41 In finding for the students, the Court established a new standard
by which to evaluate the question of expression versus school discipline:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify pro-
hibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always ac-
company an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no
finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct
would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, the pro-
hibition cannot be sustained.42
The Court found the school administrators arguments of possible school disruption
unconvincing.43 As the majority opinion concluded, there was no evidence what-
ever of petitioners interference, actual or nascent, with the schools work and the
armbands in no way interfered with the rights of other students.44 Simply fearing
negative repercussions resulting from the armbands was not sufficient to punish
students because, as the Court argued, the undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.45
Writing for the majority, Justice Abe Fortas established early in the Courts opinion
the thinking that would underlie his analysis when he wrote, It can hardly be argued
that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate,46 a line cited in some form in almost every sub-
sequent student speech case. To emphasize the broad nature of child First Amendment
rights, Justice Fortas also explained that the free expression rights belonging to students
were not temporally, physically, or scholastically limited:
39 Id. at 50405.
40 Id. at 505.
41 Id. at 507.
42 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
43 See id. at 508.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 506.
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The principle of these cases is not confined to the supervised and
ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom. The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommo-
date students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain
types of activities. Among those activities is personal intercom-
munication among the students. This is not only an inevitable
part of the process of attending school; it is also an important part
of the educational process. A students rights, therefore, do not
embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria,
or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial sub-
jects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropri-
ate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding
with the rights of others.47
Thus, according to the majority, the free speech rights of students are not to be lim-
ited to the confines of the classroom or even to administration-approved discussion
topics. As the Court would later characterize Tinker, the decision shows that while
children are subject to more state authority than adults, the state may not arbitrarily
deprive [children] of their freedom of action altogether.48
Justice Hugo Black, however, wrote a scathing dissent49 in Tinker, arguing the
majoritys decision represented a shift of the power to control pupils from school ad-
ministrators to the Court.50 By the time the case was decided, Justice Black was nearing
the end of his tenure on the Court, and, according to biographer Roger K. Newman, it
was a period notable for an increasing number of dissents51 and the loss of the marked
sense of knowing when not to write.52 The Justice took his Tinker dissent both
seriously and personally, as it began with a set of handwritten notes that were typed,
retyped, and even edited shortly before he read his dissent from the bench.53 Before
47 Id. at 51213 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d
at 749).
48 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 637 n.15 (1979) (plurality opinion).
49 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).
50 Id.
51 ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 588 (1994); see also JOHN W.
JOHNSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS: TINKER V. DES MOINES AND THE 1960S 176
(1997) (finding that Justice Black dissented on eighteen occasions during the term Tinker was
decided, the most of any Justice on the Court).
52 NEWMAN, supra note 51, at 588. Newman noted that, as early as 1966, friends and family
noticed a change in Justice Blacks demeanor, and the Justice himself confided in 1967 that
Court work is harder now and my mind isnt as quick. Id. at 589. In the spring of 1968,
Justice Black also suffered transitory (or mini) strokes. Id.
53 JOHNSON, supra note 51, at 176.
2015] NEITHER TINKER, HAZELWOOD, FRASER, NOR MORSE 793
he began reading, Justice Black took the opportunity to deliver extemporaneous re-
marks, beginning them in part with his declaration that I want it thoroughly known
that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any part of what the Court does today.54
Justice Black, a self-professed First Amendment absolutist,55 viewed the case
primarily as one deciding the proper time and place of speech instead of an adminis-
trative ban on the speech of students; as he plainly stated in his dissent, I have never
believed that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in demonstrations
where he pleases and when he pleases.56 Justice Black also suggested the majority
opinion revived the Lochner57-era practice of acting as a super legislature58 before
concluding that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age
they need to learn, not teach.59 Arguments for judicial restraint and time, place, and
manner restrictions aside, the Justice also framed speech rights for students as turning
over control of the nations schools to the children who attend them, writing:
54 Id.
55 See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L.REV. 865, 867 (1960) (It is my belief
that there are absolutes in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put there on purpose by
men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibitions to be absolutes. The whole
history and background of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as I understand it, belies the
assumption or conclusion that our ultimate constitutional freedoms are no more than our
English ancestors had when they came to this new land to get new freedoms. The historical
and practical purposes of a Bill of Rights, the very use of a written constitution, indigenous
to America, the language the Framers used, the kind of three-department government they
took pains to set up, all point to the creation of a government which was denied all power to
do some things under any and all circumstances, and all power to do other things except
precisely in the manner prescribed.).
56 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 52122 (The truth is that
a teacher of kindergarten, grammar school, or high school pupils no more carries into a
school with him a complete right to freedom of speech and expression than an anti-Catholic
or anti-Semite carries with him a complete freedom of speech and religion into a Catholic
church or Jewish synagogue. Nor does a person carry with him into the United States Senate
or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a complete constitutional right to
go into those places contrary to their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases. It
is a myth to say that any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he
pleases, and when he pleases.).
57 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The Courts decision invalidated a New York
state law setting maximum hours for bakers. Id. at 4546 & n.1, 64. The majority in Lochner
found that the law violated a liberty of contract, id. at 61, a theory later used to find many
otherwise lawful economic regulations unconstitutional. See generally David A. Strauss, Why
Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (2003) (explaining why Lochner was one of
the most widely reviled decision[s] of the last hundred years).
58 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 51821 (Black, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 522; see also NEWMAN, supra note 51, at 59192 (detailing Justice Blacks com-
ments to his wife that he might begin his Tinker dissent by writing: It is a fine thing America
is going to the moon because the Supreme Court will have extended jurisdiction).
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[I]f the time has come when pupils of state-supported schools,
kindergartens, grammar schools, or high schools, can defy and
flout orders of school officials to keep their minds on their own
schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of per-
missiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary.60
While Justice Black did not win the argument in Tinker, he certainly established
a reoccurring frame of speech for debate: speech rights for public school students
versus control for school administrators and judicial deference to their decision
making authority. Following the spirit of Justice Blacks dissent, later Court deci-
sions would erode thestudent right toexpression established in Tinker. Tinker, heralded
by scholars as the most important Supreme Court case in history protecting the con-
stitutional rights of students,61 served as the sole Court case in the area of student
speech rights for less than twenty years before two cases decided in the 1980s began
to erode the principles established in the iconic 1969 ruling. Those subsequent
decisions, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser62 and Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,63 were followed in 2007 by Morse v. Frederick,64 another Court decision
that limited free speech rights for students.
B. Bethel School District v. Fraser
In Fraser, a Pierce County, Washington, high school senior stood before an
assembly of 600 students to give a student government nominating speech65 that
veered into the patently sexual:
I know a man who is firmhes firm in his pants, hes firm in
his shirt, his character is firmbut most . . . of all, his belief in
you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in.
If necessary, hell take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesnt
attack things in spurtshe drives hard, pushing and pushing until
finallyhe succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very endeven the climax,
for each and every one of you.
60 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
61 Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the School-
house Gates: Whats Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527 (2000).
62 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
63 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
65 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 677.
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So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-presidenthell never come
between you and the best our high school can be.66
Some students yelled and lewdly gestured during Frasers speech, while others
seemed to be confused and embarrassed, according to a school counselor who attended
the assembly.67 The day after he gave his speech, Fraser was summoned to the assis-
tant principals office and informed of his punishment: a three-day suspension and
the removal from a list of students being considered to speak at graduation.68 Upon
appealing his discipline, Fraser won in federal district court, as the court found that
the school violated his First Amendment rights.69 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit subsequently upheld the district courts decision, finding Frasers
sexually themed speech was indistinguishable from the armband protest in Tinker.70
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that allowing administrators to censor
student speech that appeared to be lewd or indecent would only increase the risk of
cementing white, middle-class standards for determiningwhat isacceptableand proper
speech and behavior in our public schools.71
The Supreme Court, however, in a majority opinion written by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, reversed the Ninth Circuits decision and found Frasers punishment
to be constitutional, holding that [t]he First Amendment does not prevent the
school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as
respondents would undermine the schools basic educational mission.72 While the
Court did not expressly state the decision was a break from precedent, Chief Justice
Burger distinguished the case from Tinker, citing the marked distinction between
Frasers speech and the nondisruptive, passive expression of Mary Beth Tinkers
armband.73 Chief Justice Burger also noted that the discipline imposed on Fraser was
unrelated to any political viewpoint unlike the punishment levied in Tinker.74 So
while Fraser would become an exception to the Tinker analysis, the Court was some-
what less than explicit in explaining how the two decisions would interact.75
In evaluating the merits of Frasers speech, the Chief Justice made a few points in
examining the fundamental nature of both schools and student expression. First, after
66 Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
67 Id. at 678.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 679.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 680 (quoting Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir.
1985)).
72 Id. at 685.
73 Id. at 680.
74 Id. at 685.
75 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (The mode of analysis employed
in Fraser is not entirely clear.).
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noting that public schools function in part to train students for participation in de-
mocracy, Chief Justice Burger cited the notion that [t]he undoubted freedom to advo-
cate unpopular and controversial views in schools must be weighed against societys
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.76 This socially appropriate behavior that schools should instill in their
students includes consideration for all sensibilities in [e]ven the most heated political
discourse, according to Chief Justice Burger, who cited a litany of various House
and Senate rules governing member decorum to support his proposition.77
Second, after citing Cohen v. California78 and its protection of possibly offensive
expression in the public square, the Chief Justice noted that speech rights are not always
the same between adults and students: It does not follow . . . that simply because
the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making
what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must be permitted to
children in a public school.79 Thus, according to the Court, the First Amendment
gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinkers armband, but not
Cohens jacket.80
Finally, Chief Justice Burger concluded the majority opinion by focusing exten-
sively on a paternalistic need to protect students from the subject matter in Frasers
speech.81 The majority derided Fraser as a confused boy as it again endorsed a
schools right to determine whether essential lessons of civil, mature conduct can be
conveyed in an environment permissive to lewd and indecent speech.82 The Chief
Justice also wrote that Frasers speech was acutely insulting to teenage girl students
and could be seriously damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only
14 years old and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.83 Finally, he cited
approvingly Ginsberg v. New York84 and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation85 as cases rep-
resenting limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in reaching
an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may
76 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
77 Id. at 68182. As the Chief Justice concluded, Can it be that what is proscribed in the
halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate? Id. at 682. This assertion
fails to take into account that the rules governing conduct in Congress are determined by the
membership and subject to amendment. No such situation exists in public schools.
78 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding a jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft to be protected
speech under the First Amendment).
79 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
80 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d
Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring)).
81 See id. at 68386 (The schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the
essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd,
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.).
82 Id. at 683.
83 Id.
84 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
85 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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include children and an endorsement of the states interest in protecting minors
from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.86
Ultimately, Fraser stands for the proposition that school administrators can move
to censor student speech they find to be lewd or offensive and that, furthermore, this
censorship need not be premised on the presence or threat of a disruption. Often,
lower courts have interpreted this authority to act against vulgar or offensive speech
broadly in giving schools the ability to censor any student speech found to be ob-
jectionable; other courts have interpreted Fraser more narrowly, upholding the consti-
tutionality of school discipline only where student speech was sponsored by the school
in some way.87 The lack of disruption in Fraser88 and the subsequent constitutional-
ity of the schools actions makes the case an exception to the Tinker standard;
whether Fraser was truly an exception would be a matter of debate as the Court
carved yet another way out of the Tinker analysis in its next student speech case.
C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
School administrative authority to censor student speech would broaden with the
Courts 1988 decision in Hazelwood.89 The facts in the case center on a dispute
between a principal and student journalists working for Hazelwood East High Schools
Spectrum, a newspaper that was produced as a part of the Missouri schools journalism
curriculum.90 Before each issue was published, standard procedure dictated that the
papers faculty advisor submit page proofs to the high schools principal for prior
approval.91 Three days before the publication of the final issue of the school year, the
86 See id. at 68485.
87 See David L. Hudson, Jr. & John E. Ferguson, Jr., The Courts Inconsistent Treatment of
Bethel v. Fraser and the Curtailment of Student Rights, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 181, 191
(2002) (However, recent developments in the lower courts show the Fraser decision may
do more to curtail the rights Tinker recognized than Hazelwood. The problem originates in
the way Fraser is interpreted by some lower courts. The issue that has caused a split in the First
Amendments application is whether Fraser allows schools to censor any speech deemed
vulgar or offensive (broad reading), or whether Fraser only allows the regulation of speech
that is sponsored by the school (narrow reading).).
88 In the majority opinion, scant evidence is cited for the proposition that the speech dis-
rupted the operation of the school. During the speech, some in the audience hooted and
yelled while others simulated the acts Fraser referenced, and the day after the speech, one
teacher felt compelled to discuss the speech with her class. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. Still, there
is no sign the speech was disruptive in a way that would satisfy the Tinker standard, even
though Justice William Brennan argued in his concurring opinion the case was easily decided
under Tinker. See id. at 68790 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also supra notes 6675 and
accompanying text. Perhaps this point was best addressed by a rule in the Bethel High School
disciplinary code: Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational
process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. Fraser, 478
U.S. at 678. For the majority, Frasers speech was disruptive simply as a matter of course.
89 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
90 Id. at 262.
91 Id. at 263.
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principal found fault with two stories: one on students and teenage pregnancy and
another on students dealing with divorced parents.92 In the principals judgment, the
students in the pregnancy story might have found their privacy compromised, even
with the papers decision to use pseudonyms; while in the story dealing with divorce,
the principal thought that the parents written about were not given the opportunity
to respond to unflattering comments.93 After considering the time frame and with the
end of the year nearing, the principal decided to simply withhold from publication
the two pages containing the stories rather than seek changes to their content.94
Student editors unhappy with the principals decision then sued, arguing that their
First Amendment rights had been violated.95 The district court, however, concluded
the principals actions were justified in light of the schools educational function.96
The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding Spectrum to be a public forum that could be
censored only under Tinkers material and substantial interference standard.97 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld the principals cen-
sorship, choosing to make a distinction between Tinker and situations where a school
is called to sponsor student expression in some way.98
In writing for the majority, Justice Byron White first considered the legacy of
Tinkerthat [s]tudents in the public schools do not shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate99in light of the Courts
decision in Fraser, citing from that case both the idea that student speech rights can
be limited and that courts should defer to school administrative decisions.100
In concluding the censorship was constitutionally permissible, Justice White
quickly dismissed the Eighth Circuits public forum determination. As he found, [t]he
public schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other tradi-
tional public forums that time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assem-
bly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.101
Instead of a square, park, or other type of historically recognizable public forum, Justice
White argued, Spectrum was a tightlycontrolled environment where the advisor picked
the papers editors, picked publication dates, assigned stories to those taking the
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 26364.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 265.
98 Id. at 27273.
99 Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
100 See id. at 26667.
101 Id. at 267 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); see also
Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content
and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA.L.REV. 1219, 122021 (1984) (explaining
differences in traditional, designated, and nonpublic forums).
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schools Journalism II class, edited stories, and worked with the printing company.102
That level of control evidenced a purpose to create a supervised learning experience
for journalism students, rather than a public forum, according to Justice White.103
Justice White then distinguished Hazelwood from Tinker, with the former being
a question of whether a school must affirmatively . . . promote particular student
speech and the latter simply being a matter of whether a school must tolerate par-
ticular student speech.104 This first category is exempt from the material and substan-
tial disruption standard because, as Justice White concluded, what was articulated
in Tinker for determining when a school may punish student expression need not
also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and
resources to the dissemination of student expression.105
Thus, the schools level of control over the newspaper and its integration with
the curriculum both set the facts of Hazelwood outside the realm of Tinker and allowed
school officials a greater degree of control over a particular subset of student speech.
In defining what is to be considered part of a schools curriculum, Justice White cited
school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear
the imprimatur of the school that must be supervised by faculty members and de-
signed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.106
Control over this form of curriculum-based, sponsored student expression is easily
justifiable, according to Justice White:
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this sec-
ond form of student expression to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate
for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual
speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.107
Under the Hazelwood standard, administrators can silence all sponsored speech
that would fall under the Tinker rubric as well as speech that is . . . ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or
unsuitable for immature audiences.108 Given the facts of the case, Justice White
focused on the immature audiences issue as he cautioned that schools must be able
to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience where student
102 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 268.
103 Id. at 270.
104 Id. at 27071.
105 Id. at 27273.
106 Id. at 271.
107 Id.
108 Id.
800 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:785
speech on sensitive topics likedivorceand teen pregnancyisconcerned.109 Hazelwoods
holding, though, is premised on the educational and supervisory nature of the rela-
tionship between the school and the newspaper in addition to giving schools the
ability to distance themselves from student speech that might be unfairly attributed
to the administration.110
Overall, the Courts holding is broad and grants a great deal of latitude where ad-
ministrators and teachers act in the interest of legitimate pedagogical concerns,111 and
that leeway only increases when courts defer to administrators in determining what is
a valid pedagogical purpose.112 Still, this authority must be read in light of the require-
ment that speech subject to Hazelwood oversight must bear the schools imprimatur
in addition to being supervised by faculty with some attached learning component.
D. Morse v. Frederick
Morse,113 the Courts most recent student speech decision, came in 2007 after
a nearly two-decade silence on the issue. In Morse, high school students were dismissed
from class in order to watch the 2002 Olympic torch relay as it passed through Juneau,
109 Id. at 272.
110 See Samuel P. Jordan, Comment, Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student
Speech: Avenues for Heightened Protection, 70 U.CHI.L.REV. 1555, 156061 (2003) (The
Court cited two primary justifications for the heightened interest of school authorities when
student speech is school-sponsored. First, the educational context of the speechincluding
involvement of faculty members and the pursuit of educational objectives in the sponsored
activityimplicates the schools custodial and tutelary responsibilities more directly. Second,
a schools promotion of speech introduces the possibility that the expression will be attributed
to the school itself. Speech that bears the imprimatur of the school resembles official speech,
leaving the school free to employ reasonable measures to guard against misattribution. Be-
cause of the educational context and the perception of imprimatur, Hazelwood authorizes regu-
lation of school-sponsored speechso long as the regulation is reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273)). But see
Adam Hoesing, School Sponsorship and Hazelwoods Protection of Student Speech:
Appropriate for All Curriculum Contexts?, NEB.L.REV.BULL. (July24, 2012), http://lawreview
bulletin.unl.edu/?p=989#foot_src_o (But the Court did not emphasize the teachers control.
Instead, the Court focused on how the speech affected the public perception, i.e., whether the
public could reasonably believe the school supported or ratified the speech. (footnote omitted)).
111 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ([E]ducators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns.).
112 Jordan, supra note 110, at 1555; see also Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan O. Hafen, The
Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990s, 69 ST. JOHNSL.REV.
379, 396 (1995) (These courts accept the Supreme Courts recognition that school officials
must have broad discretion to pursue their primary educational mission of preparing children
for adulthood and full integration into society.).
113 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
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Alaska.114 One student, a senior named Joseph Frederick, was late to school that day
but on arrival met his friends on property across the street from Juneau-Douglas
High School to watch the torch relay.115 As torchbearers and the cameras passed the
students, Frederick and his friends unveiled their surprise for the day: a fourteen-
foot banner reading BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.116 Principal Deborah Morse crossed
the street to demand the students take down their banner, and all but Frederick com-
plied.117 Following the incident, Frederick was suspended for ten daysa punish-
ment that was eventually reduced to eight days.118 Upon appealing his suspension on
First Amendment grounds, Fredericks claim was rejected by the district court, which
held that the school had the authority, if not the obligation to silence Fredericks pro-
drug speech at a gathering of students.119 The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed, apply-
ing Tinker and reasoning that administrators had failed to show Fredericks speech
would cause a substantial disruption in the operation of the school.120
At the Supreme Court, the exact message of Fredericks banner became a key
issue in the case, as the majority settled on two possible meanings: either an imperative
to use illegal drugs or a celebration of illegal drug use.121 The precise meaning of the
two, however, was ultimately irrelevant to the majority since it found Fredericks
banner to be implicitly pro-drug and upheld his punishment on those grounds.122
In writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Roberts attempted to bring order
to the Courts student speech jurisprudence by explaining the applicable principles
from both Fraser and Hazelwood.123 Fraser, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, was notable
for establishing both that student First Amendment rights are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings and that Tinker does not control
all student speech situations.124 According to the Chief Justice, Hazelwood was in-
structive in deciding Morse as it confirmed both of the underlying principles from
Fraser. Despite their usefulness, neither Fraser nor Hazelwood would become the
basis for the majoritys holding as Chief Justice Roberts expressly declined to extend
Frasers prohibition of indecent speech to cover pro-drug expression125 and found
114 Id. at 397.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 398.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 399.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 402.
122 Id. at 403.
123 See id. at 40406.
124 Id. at 40405 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
125 See id. at 409 (Petitioners urge us to adopt the broader rule that Fredericks speech is pro-
scribable because it is plainly offensive as that term is used in Fraser. We think this stretches
Fraser too far; that case should not be read to encompass any speech that could fit under some
definition of offensive. After all, much political and religious speech might be perceived as
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that Hazelwood was similarly inapplicable as no reasonable observer would believe
Fredericks banner bore the schools imprimatur.126
In holding for Principal Morse, the Court focused on the dangers posed by illegal
drug use; Chief Justice Roberts cited survey statistics showing that many middle and
high school students have either used or sold drugs.127 The danger posed by illicit
substances, in addition to a schools obligation to protect students, thus took the
facts in Morse out of the Tinker framework, as the majority concluded:
Tinker warned that schools may not prohibit student speech be-
cause of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance
or a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. The danger
here is far more serious and palpable. The particular concern to
prevent student drug abuse at issue here, embodied in estab-
lished school policy, extends well beyond an abstract desire to
avoid controversy.128
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, authored a concur-
ring opinion to state explicitly his belief that the majoritys holding in Morse goes
no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable
observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and . . . provides no support
for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any
political or social issue.129 Justice Alito explained that he was wary of any interpre-
tation of the majority opinion that would allow for the censorship of student speech
contrary to a schools educational mission, and he disclaimed any such interpretation
as dangerous and an abuse.130 Yet with a single paragraph, he encouraged lower
courts to enable school administrators to act with broad authority to censor student
speech in regard to school safety:
[A]ny argument for altering the usual free speech rules in the
public schools cannot rest on a theory of delegation but must
instead be based on some special characteristic of the school
setting. The special characteristic that is relevant in this case is
the threat to the physical safety of students. School attendance
can expose students to threats to their physical safety that they
would not otherwise face. Outside of school, parents can attempt
offensive to some. The concern here is not that Fredericks speech was offensive, but that it was
reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. (citation omitted)).
126 Id. at 405.
127 Id. at 407.
128 Id. at 40809 (citations omitted).
129 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
130 Id. at 423.
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to protect their children in many ways and may take steps to
monitor and exercise control over the persons with whom their
children associate. Similarly, students, when not in school, may be
able to avoid threatening individuals and situations. During school
hours, however, parents are not present to provide protection and
guidance, and students movements and their ability to choose the
persons with whom they spend time are severely restricted. Stu-
dents may be compelled on a daily basis to spend time at close
quarters with other students who may do them harm. Experience
shows that schools can be places of special danger.131
While Justice Alitos opinion was only a concurrence and any point he had to make
in regard to school violence was certainly dicta, those inherent limitations have not
stopped lower courts from using the Justices opinion in violent student speech cases.
Despite the language of the majority opinion that attempted to limit the decisions
scope, lower courts have begun to use the opinion to censor speech that has abso-
lutely nothing to do with illegal drug use but that has everything to do with subjects
such as violence and homophobic expression.132 As one scholar argued, in the wake
of lower court interpretation, there is widespread disagreement on what Morse means
and how it should be applied, or even to which school speech cases it should be ap-
plied.133 The expansion of Morse beyond what was perhaps its intended scope can
be blamed primarily on the language and assortment of opinions generally, Justice
Alitos concurring opinion specifically, and the lingering concerns regarding school
safety after Columbine and other acts of school violence.134
131 Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
132 Calvert,Misuseand Abuse, supra note 10, at 3; see, e.g., id. at 24 ([S]ome judges are will-
ing to expansively view the Supreme Courts ruling in Morse beyond its factual underpinnings
and, in doingso, to extend its logic and reasoning to support the censorship ofspeech threatening
physical violence and expression causing emotional injury. Thus, the issue arises whether there
are any limits on just how far these or other courts may go in stretching Morse beyond the realm
of speech advocating the use of illegal drugs.); Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One
Year Later: New Limitations on Student Speech and the Columbine Factor, 42 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 427, 438 (2009) ([Morse] has been stretched far beyond the original exception based
on speech about illegal drugs to exceptions based on illegal conduct, school safety, and perhaps
even a so called psychological exception.); Ronald C. Schoedel III, Comment, Morse v.
Frederick: Tinkering with School Speech: Can Five Years of Inconsistent Interpretation Yield a
HybridContent-Effects-Based Approach to School Speech asaTool for thePreventionofSchool
Violence?, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1635 (2012) (questioning whether the central holding of
Morse canspread outsideofdrug-relatedspeechafter lowercourts interpreted the cases broadly);
id. at 1645 (Lower courts are sharply divided over the breadth of the Morse holding, with much
of the confusion ensuing shortly after the issuance of the Morse opinion.).
133 Schoedel, supra note 132, at 1645.
134 See, e.g., Newcombe, supra note 132, at 427 (arguing that the expansion of Morse hastwo
chief causes: the Courts opinion and the Columbine factor); Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-
Morse Framework for Students Potentially Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L.
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As members of the Court came to divergent viewpoints regarding the scope and
effect of the majoritys decision even as the justices were in the process of handing
down the decision in Morse, it is not surprising that the federal courts of appeals . . .
have reached varying interpretations of the Morse holding and its impact on school
administrators authority.135 Chief Justice John Roberts commanded a thin five-vote
majority of himself and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Anthony Kennedy,
and Samuel Alito.136 However, Justice Thomas agreed in the result only to weaken
Tinker,137 and Justices Alito and Kennedy wrote to say they onlysupported the majority
decision so far as it enabled the censorship of apolitical pro-drug speech.138 Thus with
the fractured Court, the majority opinion was robbed of much of its clarity and intellec-
tual force as it failed to either overturn or strongly reaffirm the Tinker principle.139
Furthermore, the seeds for student censorship were planted clearly on the face of the
Courts decision as it embraced four propositions that could be used to argue for nar-
rowed student speech rights: a new exception for student speech rather than an existing
standard (meaning that additional exceptions could be created), student safety as a
compelling reason for censorship, political speech as an important factor in the consti-
tutionality of censorship, and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech.140
Another keyfactor in the expansion of Morse is Justice Alitos concurring opinion.
Justice Alito likely thought his opinion would make it clear Morse was limited to the
censorship of speech about illegal drugs and nothing more.141 Yet in writinghisopinion,
he stressed that schools disciplinary authority must be tied to the special characteris-
tics of the school environmentciting the physical safety of students as specifically
& EDUC. 463, 48991 (2008) (contending that the Morse opinion set the stage for an
expansive interpretation).
135 Richard Howell, Note and Comment, After Morse v. Frederick: The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Takes Another Step Toward Abrogating the Tinker Standard
for Student Speech By Permitting Restrictions on Speech Which Poses a Special Danger
to the School Environment, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 1046, 1058 (2008).
136 Justice Stephen Breyer concurred in the result, as he believed the case should have been
decided in favor of Morse on the question of qualified immunity alone. See Clay Calvert,
Qualified Immunity and the Trials and Tribulations of Online Student Speech: A Review of
Cases and Controversies from 2009, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 86, 9092 (2009) (explaining
Justice Breyers argument that qualified immunity protects principals who discipline students
for online speech).
137 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 349, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (I write separately
to state my view that the standard set forth in Tinker . . . is without basis in the Constitution.).
138 Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring).
139 Jay Braiman, Note, A New Case, an Old Problem, a Teachers Perspective: The Con-
stitutional Rights of Public School Students, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 441 (2009). As Braiman
argued, [t]he case, disappointingly, brings us no closer to understanding what the difference
is, or what it should be, between the free speech rights of students in school and those of every-
one else, everywhere else, in America. Id.
140 Waldman, supra note 134, at 48991.
141 Newcombe, supra note 132, at 438.
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relevant;142 his mere mention of school safety as an issue for consideration resulted in
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh, Second, and Fifth Circuits
broadly interpreting Morse to support censorship when safety might be a concern.143
These courts, with help from Justice Alitos opinion, have construed Morse as pro-
viding a new type of exigent-circumstances exception from the stringent strictures of
Tinker144 in effect, ripp[ing] the narrow concurring opinion of Justices Alito and
Kennedy from its factual moorings.145 The broadest interpretation of Morseone that
sees the case about safetyand danger broadly146 and grants school administrators a great
deal of deference147has five logical steps according to Professor Clay Calvert:
1. Schools, ideally, should be safe havens from physical dan-
gers, yet in reality they can be, as Justice Alito wrote, places of
special danger.
2. Illegal drugs pose one such special danger; as Justice Alito
reasoned, illegal drug use presents a grave and in many ways
unique threat to the physical safety of students.
3. Drugs are not, however, the only threat to the physical safety
of students in public school settings.
4. After the deadliest school massacre in the nations history
at Columbine High School near Littleton, Colorado, and subse-
quent school shootings like the one in March 2001 in Santee,
California, there is a palpable danger to the physical safety of
students posed by the violent conduct of fellow classmates.
5. Thus, if speech advocating illegal drug use can be squelched
under Morse without having to jump through the legal hoops of
Tinker, then speech that appears to advocate or threaten violence
against other students can similarly be stifled under Morse.148
Since it inadvertently provided the foundation for new limitations on student
speech, Justice Alitos opinion has possibly become as important as the majoritys
carefully crafted and narrow holding.149 Despite the importance it has attained in lower
courts, some scholars fault the opinion for failing to clearly state when a safety and
142 Fox, supra note 9, at 454.
143 Id. at 453.
144 Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 7.
145 Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
146 Id. at 7.
147 Fox, supra note 9, at 469; see also Schoedel, supra note 132, at 1645 (Courts since
Morse have determined that deference to school authorities can now be given based on some-
thing widerbut how much wider varies from court to court.).
148 Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
149 Newcombe, supra note 132, at 439 (emphasis omitted).
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security exigency mandates an exemption from the Tinker standard,150 while others
simply label Justice Alitos talk of school safety as dicta.151 Ultimately, if Justice
Alito had truly intended both for Morse to be a narrow holding and for his opinion
to thusly confine the majority opinion to the facts of the case, he might not have
written so much, as Professor Calvert succinctly opined.152
One final reason for the expansion of Morseand perhaps the underpinning of
Justice Alitos fears in his concurring opinionis the continued apprehension of
school violence in the aftermath of Columbine and other acts of school violence. Where
student speech is concerned, as Caroline Newcombe argued, Columbine introduced
the possibility that expression will become action, thereby necessitating a broad inter-
pretation of Morse that allows for administrators to effectively address student safety
issues.153 Indeed, as Professor Calvert resignedly concluded, [W]hen courts in the
near future grapple with student speech referencing violence and violent conduct,
the early indications from post-Morse cases . . . are that judges will read Morse in
the lugubriously long shadows cast by the tragedy at Columbine High School.154
For those in favor of curbing speech rights, post-Morse student speech has become
a trap for the unwary school administrator as they cannot fashion the sort of com-
prehensive school speech policy that will best meet the needs of their school without
quite possibly running afoul of one of the various limits imposed on the reading of
Morse.155 Jay Braiman argued even more strongly against Morse and what he saw
as its inherent permissiveness, stating the decision enables students to continue
flouting and defying school authority by characterizing conduct, which would be
150 Howell, supra note 135, at 1062 (describing the current state of the law as ambiguous
as to when Tinker can be skipped in favor of Morse).
151 See Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 6 (Justice Alito suggested in dicta
in Morse that Tinker still controlled in situations involving the potential for in-school violence,
as he wrote that school officials must have greater authority to intervene before speech leads
to violence. And, in most cases, Tinkers substantial disruption standard permits school offi-
cials to step in before actual violence erupts.); see also id. at 10 (arguing that Justice Alito
did not draft or craft a standard for those cases not covered by Tinker where violent expres-
sion is concerned, and if he had, it would have been dicta as Morse had nothing to do with
violent expression). But see Fox, supra note 9, at 470 (suggesting a legal framework for the
Morse exigency standard where once the school initiates emergency action and has time to
adequately assess the threat, any additional action must arise from a determination that: (1)
the speech may still reasonably be regarded as posing a threat of physical harm, and thus, dis-
ciplinaryaction is in furtheranceofa compelling interest per Morse; or (2) such facts exist allow-
ing the school to reasonably forecast substantial disruption within the school under Tinker).
152 Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 9. As Professor Calvert continued, [h]ad
Justice Alito simply stated his conclusion in the case and left it at that, rather than attempting
to explain it, there would be little legal ground for . . . appellate courts . . . to assert and claim
that his opinion supports school efforts to punish students for violent-themed writings. Id.
153 Newcombe, supra note 132, at 453; see also id. (It is this contextual factor [of school
violence] that should be acknowledged and put into a principled framework of analysis.).
154 Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 34.
155 Schoedel, supra note 132, at 1663.
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unacceptable and unjustifiable in any other context, as protected expression.156 Yet
for scholars supportive of student expression, the decision might well provide the
legal tool that school administrators need to squelch all manners, modes and variet-
ies of student speech that portend harm, be it physical . . . or psychological157 even
as the central thesis key to the majoritys holdingthat Fredericks banner would
have encouraged drug use among studentsremains a questionable proposition.158
To the further dismay of pro-speech scholars is the simple reality that [a]s courts
expand the scope and power of Morse, they contract and reduce the force of Tinker.159
Few, it seems, are content with the Supreme Courts most recent student speech
decision. Ultimately, Morse represents something of a failure for clarity in the de-
velopment of the law as it has done little to clarify free-speech jurisprudence in the
realm of public schools160 and neither affirmed nor rejected Tinker as a continuing
and relevant standard.161 Whether the Court will take up student speech again certainly
remains to be seen, but one thing is clear: If the Court chooses to address the bounds
of student expression, it will be stepping back into a murky area of the law, and its
decision will likely leave all parties unhappy.
II. SURVEY OF VIOLENT NON-SPONSORED CURRICULAR STUDENT SPEECH CASES
This Part will survey both the factual background and current legal analysis of
violent non-sponsored curricular student speech cases. Generallyspeaking, these cases
involve student speech that is deeply curricular in naturemeaning that it is engrained
into the learning process and therefore outside the proper boundaries of Tinkerbut
the expression does not bear the official seal of school sponsorship, which places these
cases outside of Hazelwood as well.162 Thus these cases represent a distinct subset of
student speech requiring its own, specific analysis.
156 Braiman, supra note 139, at 442. But cf. Jonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public
Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U.PA. J.CONST.L. 586, 593 (2002) (Just
as it protects the rights ofcriminals againstapowerfulgovernmentand anunsympatheticpopular
majority, the Constitution protects parents and children from a government that forces children
to attend school and from a popular majority that might not respect the way some students
and parents choose to live.).
157 Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 28.
158 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Hazelwooding of the First Amendment: The Deference
to Authority, 11 FIRST AMEND.L.REV. 291, 295 (2013) ([I]t is hard to believe that any student
in the school, the smartest or the slowest, would be more likely to use illegal drugs just be-
cause of the banner that Frederick held up.).
159 Clay Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis: Tattered and Transgressed but Still Standing,
58 AM.U. L.REV. 1167, 1171 (2009) [hereinafter Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis]; see also id.
at 1169 (arguing that Tinker faces a new problem of being overshadowed by Morse and
being used only in situations where cases mirror or closely parallel its facts).
160 Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 33.
161 Braiman, supra note 139, at 441.
162 See infra Part II.B for discussion of why current Supreme Court jurisprudence fails to
address the category of non-sponsored curricular student speech.
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A. Common Factual Situations in Violent Non-Sponsored Curricular Speech Cases
The majority of violent non-sponsored curricular student speech cases arose after
a student turned in a class assignment with violent themes or content. These assign-
ments, in turn, were either some form of artistic expression163 or fictional stories.164
Artistic expression in these cases include the painted portrayal of a police officer
being shot,165 a drawing of a school surrounded by explosives in addition to the
school districts superintendent shown with a gun to his head,166 an experimental art
project focusing on the fictional need to take vengeance on a dog killer,167 and fifth-
grader Cuffs wish to [b]low up the school with the teachers in it as depicted as
a crayon-scrawled wish written on a drawing of an astronaut.168 Fictional stories in
these cases include graphic and fanciful depictions of violence and sex,169 an essay
on a students last twenty-four hours of life,170 and a story detailing a teachers de-
capitation.171 The commonality between the seven, however, is that they were all
created either during regular coursework or they were produced at the behest of a
teacher, as in Demers v. Leominster School Department,172 a case in which a student
was told to draw his feelings and was subsequently disciplined for his creation that
depicted the school surrounded by explosives.173
The categoryof non-sponsored curricular speech is broader than classassignments.
In Emmett v. Kent School District,174 a student was suspended for a website created
off-campus that contained mock obituaries of his classmates.175 The pedagogical
implication in Emmett is that the student was inspired to create the obituaries on his
163 See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 111 (2d Cir. 2012)
(crayon drawing of an astronaut with a written wish to blow up the school); Demers ex rel.
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 19899 (D. Mass. 2003) (drawing of a
school building with explosives); Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-
WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (poster making threats to
whomever had killed the students dog); In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 195 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (painting of a child shooting a police officer).
164 See, e.g., Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2011) (fic-
tional essay about drug abuse and suicide); D.F. ex rel. Finkle v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp.
2d 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (fictional story about a student who stabs and decapitates his
fellow students); In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 73031 (Wis. 2001) (fictional story
about a student who decapitates his teacher).
165 In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 19697.
166 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 19899.
167 Boman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *2.
168 Cuff, 677 F.3d at 111.
169 D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d. at 123.
170 Cox v. Warwich Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 2011).
171 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 73031 (Wis. 2001).
172 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003).
173 Id. at 19899.
174 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
175 Id. at 1089.
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website after a creative writing class.176 While the connection to coursework is not as
strong as the previously mentioned examples, it still implies a serious tie to educa-
tion and represents expression that should be fostered as part of the learning process.
The best example of student speech that should be encouraged as part of the
educational processand therefore representing non-sponsored curricular speechwas
seen in LaVine v. Blaine School District.177 In LaVine, a student presented his English
teacher with a poem describing a school shooting.178 This poem was not given to the
teacher as a threat or for a grade; rather, the student simply wanted feedback from his
teacher in order to improve his writing.179 This type of speech ties directly to the heart
of a schools educational mission and represents all of the learning interests implicated
in Hazelwood. Therefore, such speech should be considered part of a schools curricu-
lum no matter who commissioned it or whether it was turned in to an instructor.
While there are clear factual similarities among these cases, there is also one key
distinction: Although many students and guardians seek redress in the courts for
school discipline in these cases, some students, such as those in In re Ryan D. and
In re Douglas D., were appealing adverse decisions in criminal juvenile proceed-
ings. The student speech at issue in these juvenile proceedings was still similar, but,
as Part II.B will detail, the legal analysis tended to be different, focusing less on
student speech jurisprudence and more on an examination of whether the students
speech represented a true threat.
B. Common Legal Analysis of Violent Non-Sponsored Curricular Speech Cases
While the facts are remarkably similar in these cases, the legal analysis employed
by courts to determine the constitutionality of disciplinary action taken by schools or
other state actors against students varies greatly. Several courts turned to Tinker to
address the issue, but it has not been the exclusive means of analysis. Some courts rely
on true threat analysis and state case law while others use a means of analysis that
is simply unclear.
1. Cases Using Tinker Analysis
For example, in LaVine, the Ninth Circuit eliminated both Fraser and Hazelwood
before settling on Tinker as controlling law180 when an eleventh-grade student was
suspended a total of seventeen days for his poem titled Last Words.181 As the court
176 Id.
177 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
178 Id. at 98384.
179 Id. at 984.
180 Id. at 98889.
181 Id. at 983. The most relevant part of the poem described the narrators actions as follows:
As I appro[a]ched, the classroom door, I drew my gun and, threw open the door, Bang, Bang,
Bang-Bang. When it all was over, 28 were, dead, and all I remember, was not fe[e]ling, any
remor[s]e, for I felt, I was cle[a]nsing my soul. . . . Id.
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reasoned in a decision six years prior to the Supreme Courts ruling in Morse, the
poem was not vulgar, lewd, obscene or plainly offensive, therefore placing it out-
side the boundaries of Fraser.182 Likewise, it was not suited to be decided under
Hazelwood as no members of the public could have reasonably believed that the
poem bore the imprimatur of the school as the poem was only shown to the students
teacher and friends, it was not published in a school publication, and [i]t was not
an assignment.183 Tinker was appropriate, as the Ninth Circuit determined, because
it simply covered all other speech not governed by Fraser or Hazelwood.184 This
conclusion, however, ignores the facts of Tinker185 and arbitrarily characterizes it as
a default means of addressing student speech cases, thereby foreclosing any serious
inquiry into the educational issues in LaVine.
The LaVine courts reasoning did not improve as it applied Tinkers material
and substantial disruption standard. After first noting the school had a duty to prevent
any potential violence on campus to either the student poet or others, the Ninth Circuit
found the school had a reasonable basis for its decision to suspend the student based
on his troubled home environment, stalking allegations in regard to his girlfriend,
school absences, and past disciplinary issues.186 And that was all before getting to the
analysis of the poem:
Last, and maybe most importantly, there was the poem itself.
Last Words is filled with imagery of violent death and suicide.
At its extreme it can be interpreted as a portent of future violence,
of the shooting of James fellow students. Even in its most mild
interpretation, the poem appears to be a cry for help from a
troubled teenager contemplating suicide. Taken together and given
the backdrop of actual school shootings, we hold that these circum-
stances were sufficient to have led school authorities reasonably
to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
182 Id. at 989.
183 Id. This suggests the Ninth Circuit may have at least considered an argument for the case
being decided under Hazelwood if the poem had been a class assignment rather than something
undertaken by a student on his own initiative. This conclusion, however, ignores what the edu-
cational process should be and risks a chilling effect on students seeking advice on their own
creations outside of the classroom.
184 Id.
185 Tinker, at itscore, addresses independent student speech that simplyhappens to takeplace
on the grounds of a public school. The anti-war armbands worn by the students in the case had
nothing to do with coursework or the mission of the school. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) (noting that the decision to wear black armbands
was made by community members and students in a house meeting). Instead, this expression
was distinctly apart from anything associated with the school or the learning environment.
Assuming that Tinker is a broad catch-all for anything not covered by Fraser, Hazelwood,
or Morse is simply incorrect.
186 LaVine, 257 F.3d at 98990.
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school activitiesspecifically, that James was intending to inflict
injury upon himself or others.187
Thus for the Ninth Circuit the possible disruption that made the students suspension
constitutional was not any fear or unease caused by the poem in the student body;
rather, it was the idea that the student was going to come to class and harm himself or
others as portrayed in the poem. Tinker, however, was not intended to operate in such
a way as it allows schools to act only where a substantial disruption results from the
speech itself and not any action possibly predicted in the speech.188 In short, since
the poem could not cause a school shooting or any other incident of violence, the Ninth
Circuits analysis failed to truly account for how the Tinker standard should operate.
Furthermore, in referencing the students issues at home and his various disci-
plinary transgressions, the Ninth Circuit conflated Tinker with an examination of
whether the student was a threat to the student body instead of an evaluation of the
poems potential to cause a disruption at the school. In inquiring as to the nature of the
students behavior, the Ninth Circuit was conducting something more akin to a true
threat analysis, something the court itself had determined was not germane given the
finding that the schools actions were justified.189
In Cuff, the Second Circuit did not undertake a lengthy determination of what
standard to apply when a student wrote of a wish that his school and all of its
teachers be blown up; rather, it simply stated general principles from Tinker190 in light
of Hazelwoods subsequent narrowing of student speech rights without mentioning
Fraser or Morse.191 In applying Tinker, the court cautioned that the test does not re-
quire administrators to prove an actual disruption or that substantial disruption was
inevitable.192 Instead, as the Second Circuit determined, the test in Tinker is an ob-
jective standard based on the reasonableness of the schools determination that a
disruption was likely to occur as a result of student expression.193 Finally, the Second
187 Id. at 990.
188 See Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 122 (2d Cir. 2012) (Pooler,
J., dissenting).
189 See LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989 n.5 (The school argues that James poem was a true
threat and not protected by the First Amendment at all. Because we conclude that even if the
poem was protected speech, the schools actions were justified, we need not resolve this issue.
(citation omitted)).
190 The relevant principles from Tinker, according to the Second Circuit, include the oft-
repeated line that students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex-
pression at the schoolhouse gate; that schools cannot censor speech solely on the basis of
an undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance; and that administrators must show
their actions were based on something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Cuff, 677 F.3d at 11213
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 50809).
191 Id. at 11213.
192 Id. at 113.
193 Id.
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Circuit singled out expression in the context of student speech favoring violent
conduct as an area where courts should not attempt to determine how school offi-
cials should respond.194 These administrators, as the court contended, are in the best
position to assess the potential for harm and act accordingly and should be afforded
deference where violent speech is concerned.195
In applying Tinker to the facts of the case and concluding that it was reason-
ably foreseeable that the astronaut drawing could create a substantial disruption at
the school, the Cuff courtmuch like the Ninth Circuit in LaVinenoted that the
student involved had a history of disciplinary issues.196 The court also pointed out
that other students had seen B.C.s astronaut drawing and that one student was very
worried about the drawing.197 Additionally, the court wrote that B.C.s lack of capacity
or intention to carry out his wish was irrelevant198thus similarly conflating Tinker
with a threat analysis as the Ninth Circuit did in LaVine. The Second Circuit also noted
that [c]ourts have allowed wide leeway to school administrators disciplining students
for writings or other conduct threatening violence as it cited to LaVine and several
other violent student expression cases.199
The Cuff court, however, broke from the analysis as seen in LaVine to discuss ex-
actly how the astronaut drawingrather than any violent actcould disrupt the school
community.200 Sharing the drawing with other students aggravated the threat of sub-
stantial disruption, according to the Second Circuit, and was therefore an act reason-
ably perceived as an attention-grabbing device.201 If students decided to copy B.C.s
actions, the court reasoned such reproduction might then have led to a substantial
decrease in discipline, an increase in behavior distracting students and teachers fromthe
educational mission, and tendencies to violent acts.202 Furthermore, once parents be-
came aware of the astronaut drawing and the schools hypothetical lack of a response
this could have resulted in a decline of parental confidence in school safety with many
negative effects such as the need to hire security personnel and even a decline in
194 Id.
195 Id. On the matter of deference, the Cuff court cited Fraser approvingly, quoting specif-
ically the Supreme Courts argument that [t]he determination of what manner of speech in
the classroom . . . is inappropriate properly rests with the school board. Id. (quoting Bethel
Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
196 Id. at 11314.
197 Id. at 114.
198 Id.
199 Id.
200 See id. at 11415; see also id. at 122 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ([T]he question under
Tinker is whether this boys speech itself had the potential to cause a disruption at school,
not whether the drawing might have predicted that B.C. was planning an attack. . . . Tinker
requires a causal link between the speech that school officials want to suppress and the
substantial disruption that they wish to avoid.).
201 Id. at 114.
202 Id. at 11415.
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enrollment.203 Thus, as the Second Circuit found, the school could reasonably have
concluded that the astronaut drawing would disrupt the school environment, making
B.C.s suspension constitutional.204
So while the Cuff court did not make the same mistake of confusing a school
shooting or other violence with the possible disruption resulting from student speech
as the Ninth Circuit did in LaVine, the errors in the courts reasoning are still readily
apparent. By speculating as to what might happen if the school did not act to punish the
astronaut drawing or by aggregating the effects of many similar drawings, the court
sanctioned the very undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance that the
Supreme Court cautioned against in Tinker.205 Admittedly, the Tinker test does not
require proof of an actual disturbance or that the feared disturbance was a certainty
in the absence of school action.206 But to hold that the Tinker test is satisfied by the mere
possibility that students in the aggregate maycause the slow demise of school discipline
is to reduce the standard to nothingness, and Des Moines, Iowa, school administrators
would likely have made the same argument in Tinker. As Circuit Judge Rosemary
Pooler rightly pointed out in her dissenting opinion in Cuff, [S]ome disruptionsand
perhaps some far more substantial than the one at issue in this casemust no doubt
be tolerated, lest the slightest flicker of frustration or fear in a classmate could justify
sanctioning a students speech.207 In short, the Tinker test does not require the moral
certainty of a disruption for administrators to act, but it requires more than what was
deemed acceptable by the Second Circuit in Cuff.
Other courts have also applied Tinker in cases of violent non-sponsored curricu-
lar speech. In Demers, the federal district court of Massachusetts used Tinker and
a true threat analysis to uphold the suspension of an eighth-grade student who drew
both his school surrounded by explosives and the superintendent with a gun pointed
to his head.208 In applying Tinker to the facts, the court was quick to distinguish the
violent drawing from the anti-war armbands stating that the former was not silent,
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance.209
When the drawing was considered along with the student writing I want to die and
I hate life repeatedly on a piece of paper, the court concluded simply that a
reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a school official to prevent poten-
tial disorder or disruption to school safety, particularly in the wake of increased school
violence across the country.210 This conclusion, however, was reached without any
203 Id. at 115.
204 Id.
205 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
206 See Cuff, 677 F.3d at 113.
207 Id. at 120 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
208 Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 198 (D. Mass.
2003). The student was asked by a teacher to draw his feelings, therefore placing his speech
in the category of non-sponsored curricular speech.
209 Id. at 202 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
210 Id. at 20203.
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proof as to the potential for disturbance at the school. Again, this determination con-
flated the potential disruption caused by speech with the potential harm that would be
incurred as a result of actual school violence. Yet as the court found in Demers, it
would have been unthinkable for school officials not to act.211
Despite the outcomes in LaVine, Cuff, and Demers, the mere judicial determina-
tion that Tinker applies in a given case does not always foretell defeat for students in
violent non-sponsored curricular speech cases. In Boman v. Bluestem Unified School
District,212 the Federal District Court of Kansas granted a permanent injunction pre-
venting school administrators from disciplining a student who created an abstract
art poster in class and then displayed it in a school hallway.213 The poster, unsigned
by the student, was a study on word repetition focusing on the death of a dog and a
promise of vengeance against the dogs killer;214 however, the dog, its death, and the
students violent thoughts were entirely fictional.215 Still, the student was suspended
for the rest of the school year pending a psychological exam.216
In issuing a permanent injunction against the students suspension, the federal
district judge alluded to Tinker when he wrote that once the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of Ms. Bomans poster were understood by school officials,
there was no factual basis for believing that Ms. Boman had willfully violated any
school rule, caused a substantial disruption in the operation of the school, or invaded
the rights of other students.217 In assessing the potential disruption (or lack thereof)
caused by the poster, the judge cited the school principals quick reaction to the
poster as he first found out who created the artwork and then moved to determine
whether the student was a threat.218 No evidence was presented by the school to show
211 Id. at 203.
212 No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5297, at *11 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000).
213 Id.
214 The students poster contained the following text:
Please tell me who killed my dog. I miss him very much. He was my best
friend. I do miss him terribly. Did you do it? Did you kill my dog? Do you
know who did it? You do know, dont you? I know you know who did it.
You know who killed my dog. Ill kill you if you dont tell me who killed
my dog. Tell me who did it. Tell me. Tell me. Tell me. Please tell me
now. How could anyone kill a dog. My dog was the best. Mans best
friend. Who could shoot their best friend? Who? Dammit, Who? Who
killed my dog? Who killed him? Who killed my dog? Ill kill you all! You
all killed my dog. You all hated him. Who? Who are you that you could
kill my best friend? Who killed my dog?
Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist. No. 205, No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5389, at *2 n.1 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (decision issuing preliminary injunction). The text was
written in a spiral that made it fairly difficult to read unless the poster was rotated. Id. at *2.
215 Id. at *4.
216 Id. at *7.
217 Boman, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5297, at *34 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000) (decision issuing
permanent injunction).
218 Id. at *6.
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that any students believed the poster to be a real threat, and, as the judge concluded,
there was a similar lack of evidence to show a disruption in the school.219 The judge
also noted that the ancillary distractions caused by the students decision to file a law-
suitnamely upset parties in the community and her disgruntled friendscould not
serve as the factual evidence for a disruption under Tinker.220 Therefore, without any
proof of a disturbance, the students suspension was unconstitutional.
In finding for the student, however, the Boman court was careful to both limit the
applicability of its ruling and reaffirm the authority of school administrators.221 As
the judge wrote, the ruling did not in any way diminish the authority of school admin-
istrators to suspend students who willfully violate school rules or to punish those
students who cause a substantial disruption.222 Furthermore, the judge clarified that
his ruling applied only to the students poster and that it did not prevent future dis-
ciplinary action against any studentincluding the student plaintiff in the caseguilty
of violating a school rule.223 Finally, the judge offered that the permanent injunction
against the school did not prevent administrators from adopting appropriate rules or
policies concerning the posting of items on school property (including reasonable re-
straints on the location and manner of posting items), nor [did] it prohibit the school
from punishing students who willfully violate such rules.224 Thus, the judge carefully
crafted the ruling to both demonstrate a rigorous application of the Tinker test and to
point out possible alternatives to school administrators unhappy with the result in
the case.
In assessing how courts apply Tinker in cases of violent non-sponsored student
speech, a few points are clear. First, courts like the Ninth Circuit in LaVine may choose
to use Tinker in such instances simply because it appears reasonable as a default op-
tion.225 Second, courts are likely to entertain the possibility of school violence as a
disruption fulfilling the requirements of the Tinker standard even as this violates the
essence of the Supreme Courts holding in the case.226 Finally, even though some
courts, such as the district court in Boman, will conduct a serious inquiry into whether
there was an actual disruption or serious cause to fear one, many courts will likely en-
gage in only a perfunctory or entirely speculative Tinker examination en route to
upholding school discipline.227
219 Id.
220 See id. at *7 n.2 (Although these things undoubtedly make operation of the school more
difficult, they do not constitute the type of disruption that would justify plaintiffs suspension
because they result from factors other than plaintiffs conduct in putting up her poster.).
221 See id. at *1011.
222 Id. at *10.
223 Id.
224 Id. at *1011.
225 See supra notes 18084 and accompanying text.
226 See supra notes 18689, 20811 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 190205 and accompanying text (discussing the speculative nature of
the Cuff courts analysis and the factual nature of the Boman courts analysis).
816 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 23:785
2. Cases Using True Threat, State Case Law, and Other Means of Analysis
While Tinker tends to be a dominant lens through which to examine the issue of
violent non-sponsored curricular student speech, it is not the exclusive means of
analysis for courts as they also rely on true threat examination, state case law, and
other doctrines. For example, in Demers, the federal district court of Massachusetts
used both Tinker and the true threat doctrine to uphold the schools disciplinary
action [w]ithout deciding which standard [was] appropriate.228
In Demers, the district court judge first established the basics of the true threat
analysis as an objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable person would inter-
pret the alleged threat as a serious expression of an intent to cause a present or future
harm.229 He then observed the current circuit split regarding the true threat analysis
and the viewpoint of the statement.230 Some circuit courts have adopted a test that
examines whether speech should be interpreted as a threat by a reasonable speaker
while others use a reasonable listener standard.231 Controlling precedent in the First
Circuit suggested that the judge in Demers was required to apply a reasonable speaker
test, meaning that the focus of the true threat inquiry was whether the student reason-
ably should have foreseen that the drawing of his school surrounded by explosives
would cause others to fear harm.232 Under this standard, as the judge noted, there is
no requirement that the speaker had the ability or actually intended to carry out the
threat.233 Yet after laying out the basics of true threat analysis, the judge simply con-
cluded with his determination that the student should have known that his drawing and
note would be considered a threat to the school and to himself.234 While it might have
been the case that a fifteen-year-old eighth grader235 could have taken national concerns
regardingschool violence into account while drawing his picture and thusconclude that
others would be frightened, to simply pronouncewith no further analysisthat the
student should have understood the entirety of what he was doing is nothing more than
an ipse dixit.
While Demers involved the dual application of Tinker and the true threat doctrine,
juvenile court proceedings involving violent non-sponsored student speech turned
almost exclusively on state statutory and case law. In the case of In re Ryan D., a
228 Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. Mass.
2003). While seriouslyanalyzing both Tinker and the true threat doctrine is more fundamentally
sound than simply using the former to both uphold school discipline and avoid discussion of
the latter, not deciding which standard is appropriate seems like an abrogation of the judges
central responsibility. Id.
229 Id. at 202.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id. (quoting United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 149192 (1st Cir. 1997)).
233 Id. (citing Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1494).
234 Id.
235 Id. at 198.
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California Court of Appeal overturned a juvenile courts determination that a students
painting of a police officer being shot constituted a criminal threat.236 While the court
found that the paintingcreated as a response to an arrest for marijuana possession
and submitted as an assignment for an art classwas intemperate and demonstrated
extremely poor judgment, it did not convey a gravity of purpose and immediate
prospect of the execution of a threat to commit a crime that would result in death or
great bodily injury to the officer.237 In interpreting Section 422 of the California Penal
Code,238 the court noted that the statute required that potential threats be analyzed
in the greater context of how and where they were made.239 The court also made it
clear that, to be criminally proscribable under Section 422, the threat need not be per-
sonally communicated to the intended victim, but, as the court cautioned, the defen-
dant must still at least intend for the threat to be conveyed to the victim.240 To meet
the statutory definition of a criminal threat under state law, the court made it clear that
the process required the judicial system to balance the facts against each other to
determine whether, viewed in their totality, the circumstances are sufficient to meet the
requirement that the communication convey to the person threatened, a gravity of pur-
pose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.241
In applying the law to the facts at hand, the court concluded that the painting failed
to convey a gravity of purpose along with the immediate prospect of a crime that
would result in death or great harm to the police officer depicted in the students
work.242 First, the court agreed that any painting as an expression of intention to do
harmeven a graphically violent painting, as the court pointed outis necessar-
ily ambiguous.243 Alone, therefore, the court found that the painting could not rep-
resent a criminal threat.244 In examining the painting along with the totality of the
236 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
237 Id. at 196.
238 Section 422 of the California Penal Code punished any individual:
who willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or
great bodily injury to another person, with the specific intent that the
statement, made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic com-
munication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of
actually carrying it out, which, on its face and under the circumstances in
which it is made, is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and spe-
cific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an
immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and thereby causes that
person reasonably to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or
for his or her immediate familys safety . . . .
Id. at 19798 n.2.
239 Id. at 198.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 199 (internal quotation marks omitted).
242 Id.
243 Id. at 200.
244 Id.
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circumstances surrounding its creation, the court determined that the context of the
painting resolved the inherent ambiguity in favor of the student and against a finding
of an actual threat.245 The court then discussed several facts that served to mitigate
the presence of a criminal threat: the painting was turned in for a grade,246 a month
passed between the students arrest and his submission of the painting, and the painting
lacked any notice of an intent to do harm with words such as this will be you, I do
have a gun, you know, or watch out.247 Furthermore, the court found that the actions
of school administrators suggested the painting was not a threat, as the students art
teacher found it to be disturbing and scary but she and an assistant principal who
also saw the painting did not call police.248
Most importantly for the students innocence, however, was the lack of any evi-
dence that he had the specific intent that the painting be shown to the officer depicted
in it.249 As the court concluded, the evidence suggested that the student could have,
and perhaps even should have foreseen the possibility that the officer would learn of
the painting and see it.250 This mere possibility, though, was insufficient to establish the
specific intent necessary for criminal liability.
In concluding itsopinion, thecourt noted the difficultyof balancing safetyconcerns
with the constitutional guarantee of free speech:
We certainly find no fault with the school authorities and the
police treating the matter seriously. The painting was a graphic,
if mythical, depiction of the brutal murder of [a police officer].
Without question, it was intemperate and demonstrated extremely
poor judgment. But the criminal law does not, and can not, im-
plement a zero-tolerance policy concerning the expressive depic-
tion of violence.251
Thus, the California Court of Appeal concluded that at least the states criminal
code must allow for the creative depiction of violence in a school setting, but it did
not speculate on whether school administrators could have disciplined the student
for the painting. With In re Douglas D., the Wisconsin Supreme Court provided
some measure of insight into the boundaries of criminal law and the application of
245 Id.
246 Id. As the court noted, simply turning in an assignment would be a rather unconventional
and odd means of communicating a threat, as [o]rdinarily, a person wishing to threaten
another would not do so by communicating with someone in a position of authority over the
person making the threat. Id.
247 See id. at 20001.
248 Id. at 201.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 20102.
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school discipline as it applied a state disorderly conduct statute and the true threat
doctrine to decide a case involving violent non-sponsored curricular speech.252
In the Wisconsin case, an eighth-grade English student was given a creative
writing assignment with no limit regarding the topic on which he was to write, and
other students would finish the assignment.253 Instead of beginning the assignment,
however, the student talked with friends and disrupted the class, upon which his
teacher sent him into the hall outside of the classroom to begin working.254 At the
end of the class period, the student handed in the following short story:
There one lived an old ugly woman her name was Mrs. C
that stood for crab. She was a mean old woman that would beat
children sencless. I guess thats why she became a teacher.
Well one day she kick a student out of her class & he dint
like it. That student was named Dick.
The next morning Dick came to class & in his coat he con-
seled a machedy. When the teacher told him to shut up he whiped
it out & cut her head off.
When the sub came 2 days later she needed a paperclipp so
she opened the droor. Ahh she screamed as she found Mrs. C.s
head in the droor.255
The teacherwho often referred to herself as Mrs. C256believed the story to be
a threat against her if she again disciplined the student.257 After the class was dis-
missed, she informed the school principal, and the student was then called to the
assistant principals office, where he apologized and insisted the story was not a
threat.258 Despite his assertion, the student was given an in-school suspension and
moved to a different English class.259 Even with this school punishment already
handed down and no sign that the student was a continuing behavioral problem, police
filed a delinquency petition a month after the story was turned in alleging that the
student had engaged in abusive conduct under circumstances in which the conduct
tends to cause a disturbance, which was a violation of the Wisconsin state disor-
derly conduct statute.260
252 626 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Wis. 2001).
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 73031 (all errors in original).
256 Id. at 730.
257 Id. at 731.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In applying the disorderly conduct statute261 to the short story in the case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court made some important preliminary determinations: pure
speech could be punished under the law,262 threatening speech in the school environ-
ment can cause a disruption irrelevant of the specific content,263 and that the lack of
an actual disruption was not dispositive to the outcome of the case.264 After the initial
findings, the only issue before the court was whether the students story was protected
speech under the First Amendment, since the court determined that Wisconsins dis-
orderly conduct statute could only criminalize speech that was wholly without con-
stitutional protection.265
In concluding that the story was indeed protected speech under the First Amend-
mentand that subsequently the students disorderly conduct adjudication could not
standthe court noted the distinction between a threat and a true threat.266 A
threat, the court reasoned, is a nebulous concept describing anything from an
expression of an intention to inflict pain, injury, evil, or punishment to a general-
ized menacing,267 while a true threat, as the court defined it, is a constitutional
term of art used to describe a specific category of unprotected speech and subject
to a complete ban by the statethus true threats were subject to proscription under
the disorderly conduct statute.268
In determining whether expression is a true threat, the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
like the court in Demers, employed a reasonable speaker analysis.269 In applying the
261 The Wisconsin law specified that [w]hoever, in a public or private place, engages in
violent, abusive, indecent, profane, boisterous, unreasonably loud or otherwise disorderly
conduct under circumstances in which the conduct tends to cause or provoke a disturbance
is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor. Id. at 732.
262 See id. at 735 ([T]he First Amendment does not inherently bar the State from applying
[the disorderly conduct statute] to unprotected speech, even if the unprotected speech is
purely written speech.).
263 See id. at 73738 (However, we cannot agree with Douglass contention that
threatening a public school teacher while in school is not the type of conduct that tends to
cause or provoke a disturbance. . . . [T]he public has become increasingly concerned with
serious student threats of violence. With this in mind, we cannot imagine how a student
threatening a teacher could not be deemed conduct that tends to menace, disrupt, or destroy
public order. (citations omitted)).
264 See id. at 738 (Simply because a listener exhibits fortitude in the face of a threat is no
reason to allow the threat to go unpunished. Accordingly, we conclude that the fact that
Douglass story did not cause an actual disturbance is irrelevant to the present inquiry. It is
enough that Douglas conveyed his story to Mrs. C under circumstances where such conduct
tends to cause or provoke a disturbance.).
265 Id. at 73839.
266 Id.
267 Id. at 739 (quoting THEAMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THEENGLISH LANGUAGE
1868 (3d ed. 1992)).
268 Id. at 739 (citing State v. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d 762 (Wis. 2011)).
269 See id. at 73940 (describing the test as whether a speaker would reasonably foresee that
a listener would reasonably interpret as a serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm, as
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reasonable speaker test, the court found that the juvenile defendant could have ex-
pected another student to end his grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event
just as the class assignment had called for, meaning that his story was indeed not a
true threat despite his teacher feeling threatened and his direct communication of the
story to her.270 The court cited several factors in determining that the story was not a
serious expression of a purpose to inflict harm,271 including that it was written in
the third person, it contained hyperbole and attempts at jest, and that the student was
merely completing a class assignment within its given parameters.272 The fact that
the story was written for class was important to the courts analysis as it argued that
[h]ad [the student] penned the same story in a math class, for example, where such
a tale likely would be grossly outside the scope of his assigned work, we would have
a different case before us.273
While the Wisconsin Supreme Courts analysis using the true threat doctrine is
far superior to the application as seen in the Demers opinion, it still leaves some-
thing to be desired as it fails to truly consider whether the student speaker should
have reasonably foreseen whether others would take the short story as a true threat.
The court did mention that the student could have expected another student to end his
grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined eventthus attempting to analyze what
the student should have understood at the time he wrote his storybut all other rele-
vant facts cited by the court in its analysis speak to how a reader would understand
the story.274 While an argument could be made that the writer was a careful student
of English and clearly understood how a change in narrative perspective could affect
the threatening tone of a violent short story, this seems unlikely at best.275 Similarly,
distinguished from hyperbole, jest, innocuous talk, expressions of political views, or other
similarly protected speech. It is not necessary that the speaker have the ability to carry out
the threat (footnote omitted)).
270 Id. at 741.
271 Id. at 739 (defining true threat for purposes of the reasonable speaker test).
272 Id. at 741.
273 Id.
274 See id. at 741. As the court argued:
[I]n the context of a creative writing class, [the students] story does not
amount to a true threat. First, the story does not contain any language
directly addressed from [the student] to Mrs. C. Rather, it is written in the
third person, with no mention of [the student]. Second, [the students]
story contains hyperbole and attempts at jest. It jokes that the C in
Mrs. C is short for crab. In addition, it suggests that Mrs. C is so mean
that she beats children and speculates that, for this reason, she became
a teacher. Third, Mrs. C explained to [the student] that in this particular
assignment, he merely was to begin writing a story that other children
would complete. Thus, [the student] could have expected another student
to end his grisly tale as a dream or otherwise imagined event.
Id.
275 See id. But see id. at 756 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (noting that in third-person fiction, the
writer is not an actor; the writer stands apart manipulating the characters such as Dick and
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the court does not clarify how the student should have understood what it meant to
include his attempts at jest.276
Admittedly, the courts true threat test does cite both a speaker [who] would rea-
sonably foresee and a listener [who] would reasonably interpret, but by the courts
own definition, the analysis begins with what the speaker knows and understands.277
Therefore, more attention should have been given to precisely what a reasonable
student would have understood in the writers situation.278
Despite finding for the student, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful to
frame its decision as providing protection only against criminal charges, as the court
maintained the school took appropriate disciplinary action against the student279
and that [b]y no means should schools interpret this holding as undermining their
authority to utilize their internal disciplinaryprocedures to punish speech.280 In coming
to the conclusion that the decision to impose an in-school suspension281 against the stu-
dent was justified, the court engaged in a discussion of the relevant Supreme Court
cases, noting Tinkers admonishment that educators may not punish students merely
for expressing unpopular viewpoints282 and contrasting that with the language from
Fraser suggesting that schools must inculcate in our children the habits and manners
Mrs. C. to do his bidding and thus the student was capable of conveying a threat through
the words and actions of his characters).
276 See id. at 741.
277 See id. at 739.
278 The dissent, somewhat mockingly, actually phrases this line of analysis well:
[L]ooking backward, the question the circuit court faced was whether a
speaker or writer in Douglass position (a 13-year-old boy, already an ad-
judicated delinquent, who had clashed with his teacher about discipline
matters in the past and who was angry because his teacher had sent him
out into the hall during an English class) would reasonably foresee that
a listener or reader in the teachers position (a new teacher, beginning
her first full year of teaching in a public school, in a national environ-
ment of apprehension about school violence, who is handed a crude piece
of fiction that insults teachers, names and criticizes her thinly-veiled [sic]
fictional equivalent, draws a parallel to a disciplinary incident in which
the teacher was involved moments before, and then implies that the stu-
dent will cut off her head with a machete because he is angry at her dis-
cipline) would reasonably interpret the writing as a serious expression
of a purpose to inflict harm (actual injury, intimidation, or fear of injury,
thereby disrupting her emotional tranquility and her ability to teach in the
classroom), as opposed to hyperbole and exaggeration or jest that would
make a person smile at the students imagination and cleverness.
Id. at 755 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
279 Id. at 741.
280 Id. at 742.
281 See id. at 731. The length of suspension, however, was unclear.
282 Id. at 742 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
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of civility.283 The court then implied that Fraser was particularly applicable as it
found that the school had more than enough reason to discipline [the student] for the
content of his story as it represented an offensive, crass insult to the teacher.284 Thus,
as the court concluded, [s]chools need not tolerate this type of assault to the sensi-
bilities of their educators or students.285
There are at least three relevant observations to make regarding the courts dis-
cussion of the use of school discipline in In re Douglas D. First, there is no sugges-
tion that the courts conclusion as to the constitutionality of school discipline is
anything other than dicta as the student was not appealing his suspension.286 Second,
while the precise analysis is unclear, the courts decision to focus on the offensive,
crass nature of the story rather than its pedagogical implications suggests the court
would find Fraser to be controlling where possibly threatening and graphically vio-
lent student speech is concerned.287 The court does not specify why Fraser, with its
focus on sexually explicit speech, is applicable and Hazelwood is not, but the lack of
any discussion of the latter is somewhat telling as a broader failure to consider the
educational implications of violent non-sponsored curricular speech.
Finally, the discussion of school discipline is notable for the courts declaration
that schools may discipline conduct even where law enforcement officials may not.288
That conclusion may be an obvious one considering that the court found that the story
was both protected by the First Amendmentin that it was not a true threat289and
subject to school discipline, a somewhat contradictory position noted by a dissenting
283 Id. at 742 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
284 Id. at 743.
285 Id.
286 While it is unclear why the court decided to address whether the suspension was consti-
tutional, the court was likely sensitive to various public perceptions of its decision. See id.
at 742 n.16 (We recognize that public opinion regarding protected freedoms may wax and
wane over time. However, courts should not easily be swayed by public opinion, particularly
in matters of constitutional rights. . . . Ever conscious of the principles undergirding the Con-
stitution, this court must not succumb to public pressure when deciding the law. Headlines
may be appropriate support for policy arguments on the floor of the legislature, but they cannot
support an abandonment in our courthouses of the constitutional principles that the judiciary
is charged to uphold.). By both reversing the students juvenile adjudication and finding his
suspension constitutional, the court in essence could have it both ways: upholding what it found
to be its constitutional obligations in the face of a potentially unpopular decision and giving
critics of the result some measure of a victory.
287 See id. at 743 ([W]e also recognize that it is a highly appropriate function of public
school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.) (quoting
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). But see id. at 748 (Crooks, J., concurring) (suggesting that [a] school
can, and should, discipline a student for speech and conduct that is inappropriate and disrup-
tive, and in no way adds to the schools educational mission, and thus tacitly implying that
Tinker would control the analysis of whether the discipline was constitutional).
288 Id. at 743.
289 Id. at 741.
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justice.290 The specifics of the students school discipline are unclear from the courts
opinion,291 but at some point, the punitive authority of the school approaches that of
the criminal justice system regarding what exactlya school can do to a student and what
impact adverse disciplinary decisions might have.292 Therefore, the seriousness of
school discipline in all situations should be at least considered before summarily dis-
missing its consequences by implication.
While the Wisconsin Supreme Courts majority opinion attempted to balance con-
cerns regarding school violence and the rights guaranteed under the Constitution,
one dissenting justice struck a decidedly reactionary tone as he began his opinion by
listing school shooting deaths from 1993 to 1999.293 The dissent found the student
to be a troubled young man294 and would have upheld his juvenile adjudication,
arguing that his colleagues misapplied the true threat doctrine295 and inappropriately
cherry-picked through the facts to find that the story was protected speech.296
In addition to calling for deference to school administrators,297 the dissent also
argued for placing threatening and violent student speech outside of the boundaries
of the First Amendment as incendiary per se, much like shouting fire in a crowded
290 See id. at 75960 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (The majorityopinionasserts that some speech
in public schools is protected from criminal prosecution but may be suppressed by rules and
punished through internal school discipline. When? Are school officials expected to know the
answer by instinct? The majoritys untested thesis deserves authority and additional dis-
cussion.); see also id. at 75859 (The proposition that speech uttered in the exact same
contextsame speaker, same words, same time, same placeis fully protected by the First
Amendment against some state action but not against other state action, is less established. To
give speech a dual character (protected/unprotected) depending upon who is seeking to punish
it or how severe the punishment may be, will eliminate certainty in the law and create a chilling
effect upon both speech and discipline.).
291 The majority opinion cites only an in-school suspension of an indeterminate length.
Id. at 731. While this is certainly nothing to scoff at, it clearly does not rise to the level of an
expulsion as seen in other violent student expression cases.
292 In this case, the student was adjudicated delinquent and ordered to be placed under
formal supervision for a year. Id. This contrasts withhis in-school suspension. Id. If the school
had formally expelled the student or suspended him for an extended period, this school disci-
pline might have rivaled the juvenile courts punishment in terms of adverse effects.
293 See id. at 74950 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
294 Id. at 751 (Prosser, J., dissenting).
295 Id. at 754 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (The majoritys analysis is confusing. As a result,
it is not clear what impact the courts decision will have on safety and discipline in Wis-
consin schools.).
296 See id. at 755 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (It is quite wrong for this court to sift through the
factual circumstances, minimizing the factors that are present and emphasizing factors that are
not there.).
297 Id. at 758 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (Macabre writings may reflect a harmless fantasy life.
Then again, they may be a true threat. The facts are best determined byfact-finders on the scene,
not appellate judges.).
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theatre or making a joke about terrorism at an airport.298 The dissenting justice tied
his belief in this categorical exemption to First Amendment protection to the popular
conception of widespread school violence as he argued that [t]oday our country is
consumed by the outbreak of violence in public schools and that therefore [t]hreats
of violence in schools must be taken seriously.299 As the dissent contended, the
nature of the contemporary school environment coupled with, as the justice saw it,
the relatively low value of violent student speech300 meant that schools should have
carte blanche authority to punish and otherwise censor such student expression.301
However, this belief that violent student speech should be categorically exempt from
First Amendment protection goes against current Supreme Court trends to limit ex-
pression automatically excluded from constitutional protection.302
In addition to using state law and the true threat doctrine, at least one court has
addressed a somewhat novel approach in the context of student expression and
violent non-sponsored curricular speech. In Cox v. Warwick Valley Central School
District,303 the Second Circuit decided a case in which a middle school student wrote
a story for class that detailed what he would do if he only had twenty-four hours to
live.304 The story the student eventually turned in imagined his escapades in getting
drunk, smoking, doing drugs, and breaking the law and concluded with the student
taking cyanide and shooting himself in the head in front of his friends at the end of the
24 hours.305 After the story was handed in, the students teacher gave it to the
schools principal who immediately took the student out of class to discuss the con-
tents of the story.306 The student, after assuring the principal the storywas merelyfiction
and that he had no intentions to harm himself or others, was then given an in-school
298 Id. at 76162 (Prosser, J., dissenting). The dissent similarly noted that [i]ntentional bomb
scares also fall outside protected speech. Id.
299 Id. at 761 (Prosser, J., dissenting); see also id. (Almost inevitably these threats produce
fear among students and teachers. They inflict harm and impair the atmosphere for learning.).
300 See id. (Prosser, J., dissenting) (Threats of violence against students, teachers, or adminis-
trators in schools are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality. They materially disrupt classwork, and therefore
are not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
301 See id. at 76772 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (arguing that threats against students, teachers,
and administrators in a school setting should not be afforded First Amendment protection).
302 See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 46872 (2010) (noting that depictions
of animal cruelty might be protected by the First Amendment); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct.
1207, 122021 (2011) (finding that the First Amendment shielded Westboro Baptist Church
funeral protestors from civil liability).
303 654 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2011).
304 Id. at 270.
305 Id.
306 Id.
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suspension as the principal evaluated the situation.307 Concluding that there was no
immediate threat to the school, the principal sent the student home, and no further
discipline was imposed.308
School officials, however, decided to report the students parents to New York
Child and Family Services, alleging that the students parents were neglectful due
to their lack of concern over both the story and their sons other assorted behavioral
issues.309 The state agency, in turn, suggested that the student receive a psychiatric
evaluation or the parents might otherwise lose custody of their son.310 The parents
complied with the agencys request, but they decided to homeschool their son for the
rest of the year after the agencys investigation concluded the original report by the
principal was unfounded.311 The parents then sued the principal and the school dis-
trict, claiming the students First Amendment rights were violated specifically by
the principal acting in retaliation for the students story.312
In reviewing the district courts summary judgment decision for the principal and
the school district, the Second Circuit stated that to prove a First Amendment retaliation
claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) his speech or conduct was protected by the First
Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse action against him; and (3) there was
a causal connection between this adverse action and the protected speech.313 Natu-
rally, the students parents argued his story was protected by the First Amendment.314
The adverse action connected to that speech, they argued, was the decision to both
place the student in in-school suspension and make the report to Child and Family
307 Id. at 27071.
308 Id. at 271.
309 Id. The principals phone call to Child and Family Services was summarized and included
in the courts opinion:
13 yr old [student] hasbeen repeatedlywriting in his journal violent homi-
cidal and suicidal imagery while in school. He has also participated in
acts of vandalism and brought dangerous objects into school such as fire-
works and pieces of metal. [Student] recently expressed suicidal thoughts
and had a very descriptive plan for doing it in that he would take his
favorite weapon, a ruger place it in his mouth with a cyanide pill and
shoot himself and everyone would party for a week. The school recom-
mended to the parents that they seek a psychiatric evaluation for their
son but they have refused to do so. The parents are minimizing the
childs thoughts and behaviors and state that this is just fiction and all
a misunderstanding. It is believed the child is a danger to himself and
other[s] at this point. The parents are failing to provide a minimal degree
of care to their son.




313 Id. at 272.
314 Id.
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Services.315 These arguments were unsuccessful, however, as the Second Circuit up-
held the district courts grant of summary judgment.316
In coming to its conclusion, the court sidestepped the issue of whether the stu-
dents story was protected by the First Amendment to find simply that none of the
principals actions constituted retaliation.317 While admitting there was no clear
definition of adverse action in the school context,318 the court applied an objective
standard focused on determining whether a defendants actions would deter others from
exercising constitutionally protected rights.319 The court also noted that this test for
an adverse action was a highly context-specific examination and was therefore to
be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.320 In
applying an adverse action standard, the court noted the difficult position of teachers
and administrators as they have multiple responsibilities: teaching, maintaining
order, and protecting troubled and neglected students.321 Furthermore, [i]n their
various roles, school administrators must distinguish emptyboasts from serious threats,
rough-housing from bullying, and an active imagination from a dangerous impulse.322
To sort through those possible threats, the court contended that school administra-
tors must be allowed to conduct an investigation, even when that inquiry results in
a student who is separated, interviewed, or temporarily sequestered to defuse a po-
tentially volatile or dangerous situation.323 Thus, as the court determined, the tem-
porary removal of a student from regular school activities in response to speech
exhibiting violent, disruptive, lewd, or otherwise harmful ideations is not an adverse
action for purposes of the First Amendment absent a clear showing of intent to chill
speech or punish it.324 Without this ability to temporarily remove a student to assess
a situation, the court argued simply that [a] school cannot function.325
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 273.
318 Id. (noting also that First Amendment student speech cases ordinarily involve explicit
censorship or avowedly disciplinary action by school administrators and retaliation was
therefore a somewhat unusual issue in the student speech setting).
319 See id. (defining an adverse action as conduct that would deter a similarly situated
individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights (quoting
Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217, 225 (2d Cir. 2006)).
320 Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
321 Id. (also noting the mandatory reporting requirement imposed on teachers and other
school officials).
322 Id. at 274.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 See id. (Although a student and his parents might perceive such removal as disciplinary
or retaliatory, its objective purpose is protective. It affords the administrators time to make
an inquiry, to figure out if there is danger, and to determine the proper response: discipline, a
benign intervention, or something else. A school cannot function without affording teachers
and administrators fair latitude to make these inquiries.).
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With those principles established, the court concluded that there was no adverse
action, as the principals decision to remove the student to in-school suspension was
only a precautionary measure to ensure that ambiguous student expression did not
portend disruption or violence.326 Similarly, the principals decision to call Child
and Family Services was a protectivenot disciplinaryact and could not serve as
the basis for a retaliation claim.327 Therefore, in Cox, the Second Circuit made it clear
that investigatoryefforts in violent non-sponsored curricular speech were due unusual
deference and could not be considered adverse action without a clear showing of
retaliatory or punitive intent.328
Collectively, these casesDemers, In re Ryan D., In re Douglas D., and Cox
stand for the proposition that student speech jurisprudence is not the exclusive means
of analysis in cases concerning violent non-sponsored curricular student speech. While
the true threat doctrine appears to be a focus in juvenile adjudications, Demers
demonstrates that it can be used in school discipline cases as well, even as the judge
in the case declined to state whether student speech jurisprudence or the true threat
doctrine was appropriate for the case.329 In re Ryan D. and In re Douglas D. addi-
tionally show the states difficult burden in building a true threat argument where
a student willingly turns in an assignment as a part of regular coursework. Finally,
Cox is important as it distinguishes between appropriate measures designed to enable
school safety and those actions intended to punish speech, as the Second Circuit gave
schools a wide latitude for the former and suggested a prohibition on the latter.
These cases employed a distinctly different form of analysis as compared to the
previously discussed court decisions using the Tinker standard.330 Yet the Tinker
cases and the true threat and other doctrine cases used a legal framework that was
clearly established and explained in the text of the various court opinions. This clarity,
however, is not a constant in the area of violent non-sponsored curricular speech as
Part II.B.3 will show.
3. Cases Using Unclear or Incomplete Means of Analysis
Although most cases involving violent non-sponsored curricular student speech




329 Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 20203 (D.
Mass. 2003) (describing both the true threat doctrine and the Tinker standard before generically
concluding that, on the facts of the case, a reasonable interpretation of the law would allow a
school official to prevent potential disorder or disruption); see also supra note 208 (ques-
tioning the appropriateness of the Demers courts refusal to decide which case law was suited
to the case).
330 See supra Part II.B.1.
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v. Kent School District No. 415331 and D.F. v. Board of Education of Syosset Central
School District332employed a legal framework that was less explicit as compared
to previously discussed cases. However, Emmett and D.F. demonstrate that while
the facts are often similar in violent non-sponsored curricular speech cases, the legal
analysis employed can be vastly different and unfortunately unclear or incomplete.
In Emmett, a federal district court in Washington State was tasked with deciding
the fate of a student who had been disciplined by his school after creating a website that
featured mock obituaries of his friends and asked website visitors to vote on the subject
of the next obituary.333 The website, though, was inspired by a creative writing assign-
ment for class in which students were to write similarly fictional obituaries.334 After
the website was sensationalized on local television news as a hit list, the student was
given an emergency expulsion that was later modified to a five-day suspension.335
The district court, however, enjoined the school from enforcing the suspension as
the student won on a motion for a preliminary injunction.336
In evaluating the students likelihood of succeeding on the merits at trial, the
district court noted first that [t]he First Amendment provides some, but not com-
plete, protection for students in a school setting.337 The court then discussed the
relevant student speech jurisprudence, beginning with Tinker before moving on to
Fraser and Hazelwood.338 Especiallyrelevant to Emmett, the court noted that in Fraser,
Justice William Brennan suggested in a concurring opinion that the student could
not have been punished for his sexually explicit speech had it been given off-campus
instead of delivered in a school assembly.339 Applying the Supreme Courts student
speech precedents, the district court found that the students website was not at a
school assembly, as in Fraser, and was not in a school-sponsored newspaper, as in
[Hazelwood].340 Yet despite these references to Fraser and Hazelwood, a serious
discussion of Tinker and its application in Emmett was nowhere to be found in the
courts opinion.341
331 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
332 386 F. Supp. 2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
333 Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
334 Id.; see also infra notes 34044 and accompanying text (explaining why the website
in Emmett should be considered non-sponsored curricular speech).
335 Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
336 Id. at 1090.
337 Id.
338 Id.
339 Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 688 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
340 Id.
341 The court mentioned Tinker only to state the general holding (that students do not aban-
don their right to expression at the schoolhouse gates, but that prohibition ofexpressive conduct
is justifiable if the conduct would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
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Rather than applying Tinker, the court appeared to focus on its notion that the
website was not produced in connection with any class or school project342thereby
failing to recognize the websites origins in a class assignment. The court observed
that while the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to the school, the web-
site was entirely outside of the schools supervision or control,343 and, as the court
concluded, it represented out-of-school speech not subject to school discipline.344
In addition to finding the website was out-of-school speech, the court also
noted, without further discussion, the schools lack of evidence that the mock obituar-
ies and voting on this website were intended to threaten anyone, did actually
threaten anyone, or manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever.345 Without any
evidence as to the threatening nature of the website, the court determined that the
students suspension could not be sustained based on the violent content of the web-
site despite the acutely difficult position of administrators following incidents of
school violence.346 The absence of evidence as to any true threat represented by the
website, when combined with the . . . out-of-school nature of the speech, gave the
student a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his case at trial,
thereby resulting in the courts decision to grant an injunction in his favor.347
While the courts eventual determination in Emmett is easy enough to understand,
the decision still lacks a complete discussion of the true threat doctrine in addition
to the absence of an explanation as to why Tinker does not apply. Limiting the appli-
cation of Tinker is necessaryespecially where online speech is concernedbut the
opinion should have explained exactly why Tinker did not apply despite the audi-
ences connection to the school. The Emmett courts outcome was ultimately preferable,
but given the tie to the students education, the reasoning should have been different.348
If nothing else, the court could have done more to establish a clear procedure for de-
termining when Tinker does and does not apply in instances of online student speech.
Where Emmett was merely incomplete, the analysis by the federal district court in
D.F. was unfortunately unclear. In that case, a twelve-year-old sixth-grade student
wrote for a class journal a story fashioned in the style of a horror movie.349 The story
featured a protagonist who stabbed bad kids, decapitated others, and observed char-
acters kissing and having sex.350 The student first read his story without permission
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school) and to note that Fraser and Hazelwood







348 See infra Part IV for discussion of a proposed standard for non-sponsored curricular
speech.
349 D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
350 Id. (also noting that [s]ome of the characters were named after actual students).
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to others in his class, but when he asked his teacher for permission to read aloud to his
classmates, the teacher wanted to read the story first.351 Upon reading the story, the
teacher brought it to the attention of the principal, who decided to suspend the student
for five days.352 After a disciplinary hearing in which the presiding officer determined
the story was designed to place individuals in fear of bodily harm, the suspension
was increased to thirty days.353 The student, however, appealed the schools decision
in federal court, alleging violations of his constitutional rights.354
In granting the schools motion to dismiss the case and therefore uphold the
thirty-day suspension, the court explained first that [f]reedom of speech . . . is not
an unfettered right for any U.S. citizen.355 The court then noted that true threatsthat
speech serving as a serious expression of an intent to cause present or future harm
as the court defined itmay be properly prohibited.356 Additionally, the court ob-
served that student speech rights are limited, consistent with Tinker, where such
expression materially or substantially interferes with the requirements of appropri-
ate discipline in the operation of the school or would substantially interfere with
the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students.357 The court
also summarized the holdings of Fraser and Hazelwood as allowing administrators
to censor student speech that is inconsistent with [the school]s basic educational
mission, vulgar, or school-sponsored.358
Applying these relevant principles, the court concluded that the students story
was unprotected speech because the plaintiff, as a minor and a student, [was] not
entitled to unbridled First Amendment protection in the school setting.359 Exclu-
sively applying student speech jurisprudence, the court found that:
[t]he story, with its graphic depictions of the murder of specifi-
cally named students and sex between named students, may
materially interfere with the work of the school by disturbing the
students and teachers. For example, at one point in the story, the
murderer kicks a girl named Shanna in the mouth and Shanna




353 Id. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted).
354 Id.
355 Id. at 125.
356 Id. (quoting Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004)).
357 Id. (quoting Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Sch., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993 (E.D. Mich.
2003)).
358 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
359 Id.
360 Id. at 12526.
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Here the courts analysis is unclear. By referencing a possible disturbance in the
school, the court implicates Tinker, but by focusing on the graphic and sexual nature
of the story, the courts discussion implies a Fraser-based reasoning. This distinc-
tion is important as school discipline need not be premised on an actual or potential
disruption under Fraser, whereas Tinker requires something more than undifferen-
tiated fear or apprehension of disturbance.361 Therefore, the courts decision very
well could have been premised upon Tinker (assuming there was relevant evidence
of a disruption or a reasonable fear thereof) or Fraser (if the sexual content of the
story was objectionable enough), but logically, it cannot be based on both decisions.
While the student speech analysis was unclear at best, the courts use of the true
threat doctrine was remarkably incomplete. In analyzing the story under the true
threat framework, the court determined that the story constitutes a true threat of vio-
lence as it describes a student killing other real-life students.362 The court went on
to frame the problem with the story in light of school violence, writing that the court
was well aware of the legacy of fear and panic that recent acts of devastating school
violence have wrought in this country and that [s]chools must be able to protect
their student bodies against such acts and be able to provide a modicum of security
for their parents and students.363
Any discussion of the specifics of the true threat doctrine was startlingly absent
as the court simply concluded, much as the Demers court did,364 that the story was a
true threat without undertaking any real analysis or offering any explanation of its
reasoningaside fromthe general observations regardingschool violence. Compounding
this problem was the fact that the court was particularly unskilled in its word choice
as it stated that the story describes a violent incident.365 A true threat, by its very
definition, must amount to more than a simple description of violence, or otherwise
many fiction writers would be subject to criminal prosecution.366 Tying a description
of violence to the legacy of fear and panic generated by acts of school violence
does not meet the legal threshold necessary to exclude the students story from First
Amendment protections. Thus, the D.F. court failed to adequately address whether
the students story was indeed a true threat.
361 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
362 D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126 (emphasis added).
363 Id.
364 See supra notes 20811 and accompanying text.
365 D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
366 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 35960 (2003) (True threats encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] indi-
viduals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to
protecting people fromthe possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Intimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs
a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Yet this failure is merely symptomatic of a larger concern in many of the cases
that address violent non-sponsored curricular student speech in that the analysis is
simply incorrect. Some courts that apply Tinker incorrectly consider the potential harm
resulting from a school shooting (instead of the specific disruption caused by violent
student speech),367 while other courts using Tinker engage in elaborate speculation
to uphold school discipline.368 Analysis under the true threat doctrine is similarly poor,
as courts either fail to truly consider the objective perspective of a student speaker,369
or simply find that violent student speech represents a true threat without any sup-
port for that conclusion.370 However, the most notable omission from the legal analysis
in most of these cases is a consideration of the educational issues implicated when
a school or the state punishes a student speaking in furtherance of education.
Therefore, a critical analysis of these cases reveals that courts applyvastlydifferent
standards even when the factsin that they are examples of violent student speech inte-
grally related to educationare remarkably similar. Furthermore, these cases have
not been identified by courts as a discrete class of cases deserving of a specialized
analysis; rather, these cases are firmly planted in the post-Columbine, postVirginia
Tech, post-Newtown mindset of heightened deference to school administrators and
an understandable preoccupation with school safety.
This Part of the Article has focused on describing how these cases are decided,
including some examination of the perceived shortcomings of current legal analysis.
Looking at how these examples of violent non-sponsored curricular student speech
have been analyzed under current case law, it is clear that neither Tinker nor the true
threat doctrine are adequate solutions to the unique issues involved with this type
of expression not sponsored by schools but still integral to education. In an effort to
remedy this doctrinal problem, Part III begins this Articles examination of the norma-
tive ideal in trying to answer how these cases should be decided.
III. ELIMINATING CURRENT CASE LAW OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING
VIOLENT NON-SPONSORED CURRICULAR SPEECH
As Part II detailed, this Article seeks to define and clarify the proper regulation
of violent non-sponsored curricular student speech, a subset of student speech that
has yet to be substantively identified and addressed by the Supreme Court. Part III
will specifically explain why current case law as applied fails to address this area of
student speech, identifying, in turn, deficiencies with the true threat doctrine, Morse
367 See, e.g., supra notes 18689 and accompanying text (discussing LaVine v. Blaine
Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001), and Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp.
2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003)).
368 See supra notes 2126, 20007 and accompanying text (discussing Cuff ex rel. B.C.
v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012)).
369 See supra notes 26978 and accompanying text (discussing In re Douglas D., 626
N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001)).
370 Seesupra notes 22935 and accompanying text (discussing Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195).
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and Fraser, Tinker, and Hazelwood. By eliminating all of these possible doctrinal solu-
tions, only then is it clear that a new standard for non-sponsored curricular student
speech is necessary.
A. Why the True Threat Doctrine Is Not an Appropriate Approach
As demonstrated with In re Douglas D., Demers, D.F., and In re Ryan D., the true
threat doctrine has been used by courts to analyze cases of violent non-sponsored
curricular student speech. However, each of the decisions demonstrated either a dif-
ficulty in proving the presence of a true threat where a student is turning in a class
assignment, as in In re Ryan D. and In re Douglas D., or simply poor analysis on the
part of the court, such as the Demers court deciding without further explanation that
the student should have concluded that his drawing and note would be considered
a threat to the school371 and the D.F. court concluding the story in that case was a
true threat only because it describes a student killing other real-life students.372
The distinction between the four cases is seen not only in the outcomewith In re
Ryan D.373 and In re Douglas D.374 overturning juvenile adjudications, and Demers375
and D.F.376 upholding school disciplinebut also in the seriousness and thorough-
ness of the true threat analysis. When courts seriously consider the issues involved
in applying the true threat doctrine in the area of non-sponsored curricular student
speech, the natural outcome should be to find for the student and establish the absence
of a true threat.
A common sense examination of threats, creativity, and education led the In re
Ryan D. and In re Douglas D. courts to their respective determinations regarding the
absence of a true threat. As the California Court of Appeal noted in In re Ryan D., a
criminal threat . . . is a specific and narrow class of communication and [o]rdinarily,
a person wishing to threaten another would not do so by communicating with
someone in a position of authority over the person making the threat.377 Therefore,
for a student to turn in a painting both for a grade and with the intention of threatening
someone else in the school communityas the state alleged in In re Ryan D.it
would be a rather unconventional and odd means of communicating a threat.378
Rather than relying on the nature of threats, the Wisconsin Supreme Court based
its decision in In re Douglas D. more on the specific elements of the story and the
371 Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dept, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 202 (D. Mass.
2003).
372 D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
373 In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 202 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
374 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 742 (Wis. 2001).
375 Demers, 263 F. Supp. 2d at 203.
376 D.F., 386 F. Supp. 2d at 126.
377 In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200.
378 Id.
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class assignment.379 In coming to its decision, the court noted that the story was written
in the third person, contained hyperbole and attempts at jest, and attempted to con-
form to the parameters of the teachers assignment.380 More generally, however, the
story was written in the context of a creative writing classa class in which, as the
court observed, teachers and students alike should expect and allow more creative li-
censebe it for better or, as in this case, for worsethan in other circumstances.381
In fully applying the true threat doctrine, the California Court of Appeal and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court essentially came to the same conclusion: Logically, it
makes little sense to find a true threat where a student turns in a creative work that
is a part of the school curriculumeither because that does not satisfy the typical
norms of a true threat or because creativity demands some leeway when it comes to
student expression.
However, that is not to assert that a student assignment can never be a true
threat. As Florida State University neared a berth in the 2013 national college foot-
ball championship game with star quarterback Jameis Winston implicated in a
sexual assault, sports website Deadspin published an essay from an FSU English
instructor that examined the relationship between academics and major college
athletics.382 For the purposes of a discussion on violent non-sponsored curricular
speech, the essay contained a cogent example of what could be a true threat in the
context of a class assignment:
Before Jameis, there was the gay-basher. His teacher, Robert,
was also one of Florida States superstars, a professor in training
with a pile of prestigious awards and grants. He is also gay, a fact
that any of my students are gonna figure out pretty quickly, he
says. The defensive back took his required writing class a few
summers back, and they met early in the course for a one-on-one
conference to discuss an assigned essay exploring a significant
personal moment in the students lives.
It was just me and him in my windowless office on the fourth
floor of an empty campus building, Robert says. The player sub-
mitted his essay and went down the hall for a drink, while Robert
read it and promptly freaked out.
The paper was a very graphic, very detailed, very proud tell-
ing of how he basically got his high school classmates together to
379 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 741.
380 Id.
381 Id.
382 Adam Weinstein, Jameis Winston Isnt the Only Problem Here: An FSU Teachers
Lament, DEADSPIN (Nov. 21, 2013, 2:43 PM), http://deadspin.com/jameis-winston-isnt-the
-only-problem-here-an-fsu-teac-1467707410.
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beat the shit out of this faga word used often in the work
and literally kick him in the teeth to teach him a lesson. They
were sick of their mark acting like a girl, Robert recalls, and so
they went about punching him in the face, emptying his gumline.
The tone of the players essay was that he was very proud of
himself. He had taken the initiative to organize this beating.
Robert panicked. The essays victim talked sexually, had
tight clothes, and had feminine featuressome of which could
be [sic] certainly be said of me, he says. Why would he give
that to me? I took it in the moment as a personal threat.
When the player returned, Robert faked getting an important
text and begged out of the conference, then ran down to a mentors
office to report the paper. The situation was handled well, he said:
He never had to see that student again. Still, he had no clue as to
the players motivesor his rehabilitation.383
This example shares some definite commonalities with In re Douglas D., the Wis-
consin case regarding a student who wrote a short story about a student who came to
class & in his coat he conseled [sic] a machedy [sic] and cut off his teachers head.384
Both the FSU assignment and the assignment in In re Douglas D. were completed as
part of a class assignment, and they were given directly to the person they purport-
edlythreatened. Both storiesalsoemployed identifiablecharacteristics of the individual
arguably targeted, with the story in In re Douglas D. referencing a teacher by the name
of Mrs. C385 and the FSU essay describing the beating of a homosexual.386
A key difference, however, is the specific context: the story in In re Douglas D.
was a work of fiction387 as compared to the personal essay describing a purportedly
real event in the FSU example.388 In addition to being fiction, the story in In re
Douglas D. was less believable as a threat because it contained elements of hyper-
bole and humor.389 The essay detailed in the Deadspin post is different because it
purportedly described something that happened, so it can necessarily transmit an
implied message of this might happen to you as well. While such a threat may have
been present in In re Douglas D.,390 in the FSU story it is stark, real, and much closer
383 Id.
384 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 731.
385 Id. at 73031 (noting that the students English teacher commonly referred to herself as
Mrs. C. in class).
386 Weinstein, supra note 382.
387 See In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 730 (establishing the rules of the assignment).
388 Weinstein, supra note 382.
389 See In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 73031 (quoting the students story); see also id.
at 741 (explaining the courts reasoning in determining the story was not a true threat).
390 The state argued that the students threat to Mrs. C [was] direct and clear: If she dis-
cipline[d] him again, he intend[ed] to injure her. Id. at 740. Additionally, the Wisconsin
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to a legal consideration of what a threat should be: [a] communicated intent to inflict
harm or loss on another or on anothers property, especially one that might diminish
a persons freedom to act voluntarily or with lawful consent.391 Still, without knowing
more about the specific situation that was described at FSU or the students inten-
tions in writing the story, it is hard to label the students essay a true threat. It does,
however, come a great deal closer to the legal, objective standard of what a true threat
should be than any of the stories or artistic creations described in In re Douglas D.,
Demers, D.F., and In re Ryan D.
The true threat doctrine is simply a poor methodological fit for the area of violent
non-sponsored curricular speech. As the California Court of Appeal noted, the notion
of a student turning in an assignment both to threaten and to gain normal academic
credit is hard to reconcile with traditional ideas of threatening and menacing com-
munication.392 Furthermore, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded, curricular
speech requires more creative license, and a boys impetuous writings do not neces-
sarily fall from First Amendment protection due to their offensive nature.393 These
determinations serve as a sharp contrast to the D.F. courts decision that a students
story represented a true threat simply because it described violence against other
students.394 Additionally, while courts applying the true threat doctrine in juvenile
adjudications may appear to be dissimilar from courts applying the true threat doc-
trine in examining school discipline, for the purposes of true threat analysis they are the
same because the legal context should be irrelevant when considering whether commu-
nication is a true threat. In other words, the determination of a true threat for school
discipline is the same as the determination of a true threat for criminal punishment.395
The true threat doctrine, therefore, is usually inappropriate where violent non-
sponsored curricular speech is concerned. The application of this testin which a posi-
tive result renders speech unprotected both inside and outside of school grounds
should properly be limited to instances where either an intent to threaten is obvious
on the face of the creative work or the communication more closely resembles a tra-
ditional threat.
Supreme Court concluded: We do not doubt that the story was a result of [the students]
anger at having been removed from class. Id. at 741. The court, however, did not address
the conditional nature of the alleged threat.
391 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1703 (10th ed. 2014).
392 See In re Ryan D., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 193, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (This would be
a rather unconventional and odd means of communicating a threat.).
393 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 741.
394 D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
395 To phrase the point yet another way, expression cannot be both a true threat for the
purposes of school discipline and not a true threat for criminal prosecution. See In re
Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d at 743 (suggesting, in a case where a students story was not a true
threat for the purposes of a juvenile adjudication, that school discipline was justified by the
offensive, crass insult posed by the students story, and hinting at Fraser analysis).
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B. Why Morse and Fraser Should Not Apply
In evaluating whether Morse and Fraser, two decisions arguably more narrow
than Tinker and Hazelwood, should apply in instances of violent non-sponsored cur-
ricular speech, the major issues to be resolved are whether the permissible prohibi-
tion of sexually explicit speech on school grounds in Fraser extends to violent
speech in the classroom and whether Morse articulates a new standard of constitu-
tional censorship premised on school safety. To be consistent with the principles of
the First Amendment, however, the answer to both of these questions must be nothe
doctrinal solution to violent non-sponsored curricular speech cannot come from either
Fraser or Morse.
In addressing how Fraser and Morse could be applicable where violent speech
is concerned, it is important to first note thatdespite the twenty years separating the
decisionsFraser and Morse are operationally quite similar. Both involve decipher-
ing speech with vague or multiple interpretations and rummaging through message
content for an impermissible meaning, as Professor Clay Calvert phrased it.396 The
two decisions, therefore, embrace a meanings-based approach to censorship and
represent a break from the methodology seen in Tinker, a decision that was premised
on the actual effects of speech.397
Continuing the commonalities, both decisions have also seen lower courts broadly
interpret the principles contained in them. Where the decisions differ, however, is
exactly where the expansive interpretation comes into play as lower courts have
broadened what is offensive for the purposes of Fraser while other decisions have
held that Morse enables school administrators to act where speech poses a harm to
the well-being of students.398
Turning first to the proper application of Fraser, it is important to understand
how the decision mechanically works. As Professor Calvert explained, the Fraser
formula is an examination of [w]hether student message X conveys a disfavored
and inappropriate meaning Y that conflicts with educational mission Z.399 This
inquiry is a two-step process that first requires an inquiry into what the meaning of
396 ClayCalvert, Mixed Messages,Muddled Meanings, Drunk Dicks, and Boobies Bracelets:
Sexually Suggestive Student Speech and the Need to Overrule or Radically Refashion Fraser,
90 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 133 (2012) [hereinafter Calvert, Mixed Messages].
397 See id. (Fraser and Morse embrace a meanings-based methodology that permits
censorship based purely upon the resolution of the meaning of a messageregardless of its
likely or actual disruptive effect among studentsand whether, in turn, that meaning contra-
dicts some aspect of a schools educational mission.).
398 See, e.g., Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 3 (describing the interpretation
of Morse that allows for the censorship of speech that threatens a Columbine-style attack
on a school (quoting Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (5th Cir. 2007)));
Christopher Cavaliere, Note, Category Shopping: Cracking the Student Speech Categories,
40 STETSON L. REV. 877, 882 (2011) (explaining the expansive interpretation of Fraser that
creates a nebulous category of speech subject to censorship).
399 Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 134.
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a given student message may be and then a determination of whether that meaning
conflicts with some aspect of a schools educational mission.400 If strictly interpreted
and limited to its facts, Fraser would apply only to on-campus, spoken speech before
a captive audience at a school assembly where such speech conveys a sexually vulgar,
lewd, or indecent connotation that allegedly overwhelms any political meaning, while
simultaneously glorifying male sexuality in such a way that could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience.401
Yet, where courts find in Fraser an underlying theme around the issue of well-
being that goes beyond a mere Victorian sensibility of offensiveness,402 the scope
of Fraser is thus broadened to cover other types of speech that might not be compat-
ible with a schools mission. Under such an interpretation, Fraser permits stifling any
manner and any mode, spoken or printed, of any plainly offensive expression, sexual
or otherwise, that conflicts with societys interest in teaching students the bound-
aries of socially appropriate behavior.403 This broader view of the holding from
Fraser enables censorship of almost any disfavored speech, and such speech need
not be sexually explicit to fall under an expanded interpretation, as the Sixth Circuit
found when it determined a ban on religiously offensive Marilyn Manson T-shirts
on school grounds to be constitutional under Fraser.404
For the purposes of analyzing violent non-sponsored curricular student speech,
the question is whether this broad interpretation of Fraser could cover violence as well.
As previously discussed, courts have hinted that Fraser may apply where students
produce violent expression in the classroom, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated
that a students story depicting his teachers decapitation represented an offensive,
crass insult and that [s]chools need not tolerate this type of assault to the sensibili-
ties of their educators or students.405 Similarly, the D.F. court referenced the graphic
depictions of the murder of specifically named students and the sex between named
students while suggesting a hybrid Tinker-Fraser analysis.406
400 Id.
401 Id. at 146 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
402 Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., A Foot in the Door? The Unwitting Move Towards a New
Student Welfare Standard in Student Speech After Morse v. Frederick, 58 AM. U. L. REV.
1221, 1233 (2009).
403 Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 147 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
404 Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000). School adminis-
trators in Boroff found a students T-shirts celebrating rock group Marilyn Manson to be
offensive because the band promotes destructive conduct and demoralizing values that are
contrary to the educational mission of the school. Id. at 469. As per one example cited by
the Sixth Circuit in its discussion and subsequent affirmation that Fraser was controlling,
one shirt included a depiction of a three-headed Jesus alongside the words See No Truth.
Hear No Truth. Speak No Truth. Id. Fraser, therefore, was interpreted by the Sixth Circuit
to cover not only sexually offensive speech but religiously offensive speech as well.
405 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 726, 743 (Wis. 2001).
406 D.F. v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 12526 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also supra notes
34966 and accompanying text (explaining why the courts approach was logically inconsistent).
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Despite this limited embrace of the reasoning shown in Fraser to address violent
non-sponsored curricular speech, it is important to note two key limitations on extend-
ing Frasers application into the realm of violent classroom speech. First, in Morse,
the Supreme Court expressly limited the application of Fraser, as Chief Justice John
Roberts wrote that the earlier decision should not be read to encompass any speech
that could fit under some definition of offensive.407 Second, in considering the
original facts of Fraser, it is worth noting that the speech at issue in the case was deter-
mined to be an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor by the Court,408
a metaphor that caused the Fraser majority to fear for those students who were only
on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.409 Therefore, Fraser should
properly be considered as a case regarding only sexually explicit speech and thus
falling in line with other Supreme Court decisions that simply treat sexual speech
differently when compared to other types of speech.410 Together, these two points
suggest that the proper application of Fraser is limited only to sexually explicit
speech and not other speech, such as violent student expression, that might other-
wise be offensive in the school setting.
However, even as the Morse Court attempted to limit the application of Fraser,
the opinion in Morse has been subjected to its own expansive interpretation. Despite
the initial assessments that suggested Morse would be limited to speech advocating
drug use and therefore limited to the facts of the case,411 language in both the Courts
407 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007). As the Chief Justice continued: After all,
much political and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some. The concern here
is not that Fredericks speech was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting
illegal drug use. Id.; see also Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 146 (The Supreme
Courts ruling in Morse began to rein in the potential reach of Fraser, at least as applied to
offensive expression.).
408 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 67778 (1986).
409 Id. at 683.
410 Compare Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675 (finding sexually explicit student speech unprotected
in the school setting), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC inde-
cency regulations under theory of broadcast communication pervasiveness and need to protect
children from age-inappropriate speech), and Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)
(creating a variable definition of obscenity as to minors and allowing states to further insulate
them from age-inappropriate sexual speech), with Brown v. Entmt Merch. Assn, 131 S. Ct.
2729 (2011) (finding violent video games to be protected speech under the First Amendment
and that California law banning their sale to minors was not sufficiently tailored to pass strict
scrutiny), and Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (finding violent books and maga-
zines to be protected expression).
411 See Calvert, Misuseand Abuse, supra note10, at2 (explaining the initial belief that Morse
was a limited opinion, noting that [f]or instance, John W. Whitehead, president of the Ruther-
ford Institute, told the Washington Post that the decision should have a limited effect because
it applies only to student speech that promotes illegal drug use. Similarly, Susan Goldammer,
an attorney for the Missouri School Boards Association, observed that [t]he court explains this
decision is narrowly tailored toward illegal drugs. In fact, the author of this law journal article,
along with a colleague, opined in an August 2007 commentary that the case may be considered
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opinion and especially language in a concurring opinion written by Justice Samuel
Alito paved the way for a broad interpretation of the Courts decision that lower courts
have used in instances of violent student speech.412
However, just because some courts have used Morse to decide cases of violent stu-
dent expression,413 it does not necessarily mean this expansion of the decision is appro-
priate. As Professor Calvert argues, the harm posed by the use of illegal drugs is simply
different than the harm posed by school violence and makes for a poor analogy.414
Yet the strongest argument against using Justice Alitos concurrence in applying Morse
to violent speech is the simple observation by Professor Calvert that even if the justice
had articulated a new standard for regulating violent expression in public schools,
such a test would have constituted mere dicta because the case in Morse had nothing
to do with violent expression.415
The application of Morse has been limited in the area of violent non-sponsored
curricular speech primarily because most of the cases discussed in Part II predate the
Supreme Courts most recent student speech decision. However, two post-Morse cases
cite the decision only for general principles,416 as Cuff was analyzed under Tinker417
and the Cox court did not use student speech jurisprudence to decide its case.418
a minor victory for schoolslimited to the narrow circumstances of curtailing decidedly pro-
drug messages that lack a political component. In a nutshell, the Morse ruling appeared rela-
tively inconsequential for future student expression battles, cabined by its peculiar facts.
(footnotes omitted)).
412 See, e.g., id. at 67 (explaining how Justice Alitos concurring opinion is used to broadly
interpret Morse); Negrón, supra note 402, at 122324 (pointing out how language in the major-
itys opinion can be used to argue for a broader interpretation of the decision); see also supra
note 117 and accompanying text.
413 See Calvert, Misuse and Abuse, supra note 10, at 1221 (discussing courts that have used
Morse to decide cases of violent, and even merely insulting, student expression).
414 See id. at 16 (But such an extrapolation from Morse of a new censorship rule centering
on physical safety and danger is off-base and misguided. Why? Because the locus of theharm
is very different with illegal drug use than it is with violence. In a nutshell, the problem with ille-
gal drug use by a high school student involves harm to selfharm to the student who engages
in the illegal conduct. In contrast, the problem with illegal violence committed by a high school
student involves harm to othersthe students who fall victim to the actor that engages in the
violent conduct. Put differently, the use of illegal drugs threatens the physical safety of the
individual students who engage in the dangerous conduct themselves: drugs are dangerous to
those who use them.).
415 Id. at 10.
416 See, e.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2012)
(citing other lower-court decisionsunder Morse that have allowed wide leeway to school admin-
istrators disciplining students for writings or other conduct threatening violence); Cox v.
Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 27273 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing Morse for general
student speech principles such as the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings).
417 See Cuff, 677 F.3d at 113 (establishing Tinker as controlling).
418 See Cox, 654 F.3d at 273 (concluding case should be decided based on First Amendment
retaliation claim).
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Therefore, at least in the examples of violent non-sponsored curricular speech, there
does not appear to be an embrace of an expanded interpretation of Morse.
In conclusion, Fraserand by extension Morserepresent a danger to the First
Amendment because they do not rely on the actual harms caused by speech in deter-
mining whether speech should be censored, and therefore, these decisions should be
carefully limited in their application in lower courts.419 The standard in Fraser should
be left to govern only sexual expression, an area that has been distinguished from other
types of speech by the Supreme Court. And finally, the opinion in Morse should be
read as addressing only that student speech which can reasonably be understood as
advocating the use of illegal drugs. Neither standard is controlling nor appropriate in
the area of violent non-sponsored curricular speech.
C. Why Tinker Is Not Controlling
As discussed in Part II, courts have used Tinker to decide cases of violent non-
sponsored curricular speech, but the application in these cases has often left some-
thing to be desired intellectually, with some courts using the harm from a possible
incident of school violence to satisfy the rigors of the Tinker test instead of consider-
ing the actual or hypothetical harm from student speech.420 In considering whether
Tinker should apply in these cases, it is important to first note that the iconic decision
has been somewhat marginalized by the Supreme Court cases that followed it.421 With
Tinker well on its way to being confined to its facts, perhaps the best way forward
is to make another exception to the decision and find that, once again, a new standard
is needed to address a particular problem in student speech.
After the Court elected to create fact-based exceptions to Tinker in Fraser, Hazel-
wood, and Morse, it is clear the decision is waning in importance.422 What is not so
clear, however, is exactly how Tinker should be applied in the post-Morse student
speech landscape. As Christopher Cavaliere notes, courts generally take one of three
views of Tinker: looking at the decision as just another category of unprotected
speech, a general rule that protects student speech unless one of the other three
419 See Calvert, Mixed Messages, supra note 396, at 172 (Viewed at a macro-level, Frasers
embrace of the principle that the meaning of a message, standing alone and without proof of
any harm caused by it, can lead to its censorship directly conflicts with the heart of modern First
Amendment theory, which holds that society must tolerate some level of demonstrable harm.).
420 See supra Part II.B.
421 See, e.g., Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis, supra note 159, at 1169 (arguing that Tinker
is overshadowed by Morse and currently being relegated for use only in those cases that
mirror or closely parallel its facts); Perry A. Zirkel, The Rockets Red Glare: The Largely
Errant and Deflected Flight of Tinker, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 593, 597 (2009) (calling Tinker
practically revers[ed] or, at least, effectively compartmentaliz[ed]).
422 See Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis, supra note 159, at 1173 (The most obvious indicator
of Tinkers decline is that, in each of the three subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving
student expression rights, the Court chose: (1) not to apply Tinker; (2) to carve out fact-specific
exceptions to Tinker; and (3) to rule in favor of school officials and against students.).
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categories apply, or a view that Tinker may specifically protect political speech.423
Thus the first two categories operate bypositioning Tinker as either one of four possible
options in a courts arsenal or the default rule if Fraser, Hazelwood, or Morse do not
apply due to the factual circumstances of the case.424 Leaving Tinker as a default rule
seems unsatisfactory in a world where the Supreme Court has so thoroughly chipped
away at the decision. In other words, Tinker would be a fine default rule where it was
the only rule. Framing Tinker as a rule protecting onlypolitical speech seems needlessly
narrow and fraught with the additional problem of deciding what is and what is not
political speech. The best answer for Tinker is Cavalieres first category.425 Tinker,
therefore, should have situations where it does apply and situations where it distinctly
does not apply.
In answering the question of when Tinker should apply, it is important to consider
the facts of the case. Tinker, fundamentally, was about taking an external issuea pro-
test over the Vietnam Warand bringing it into the school environment by having stu-
dents wear the now famous black armbands.426 The protest at issue in Tinker did not
have its genesis on campus; rather, it was first imagined by a group of parents and
students in an off-campus meeting.427 Therefore presumably, the Vietnam War had
nothing to do with any of the ongoing studies at the Des Moines high school, making
the armbands noncurricular speech. The Court, however, did not make this distinction,
choosing instead to broadly affirm the First Amendment right of students after discuss-
ing the foundational cases that made such a right possible:
The principle of these cases is not confined to the supervised
and ordained discussion which takes place in the classroom. The
principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate
students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types
of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunica-
tion among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the
process of attending school; it is also an important part of the edu-
cational process. A students rights, therefore, do not embrace
merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the
423 Cavaliere, supra note 398, at 886; see also MatthewSheffield, Note, Stop with the Excep-
tions: A Narrow Interpretation of Tinker for All Student Speech Claims, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POLY & ETHICS J. 175, 177 (2011) (arguing that Tinker was meant to apply only where a stu-
dent was expressing an opinion on an issue of political significance or when the school was
discriminating against the student solely based upon disagreement with the students viewpoint).
424 See Cavaliere, supra note 398, at 88791.
425 See id. at 88788 (Tinkers disruptive speech is merely one among the four different
types of speech that a school may permissibly regulate.). Deciding that this is the proper inter-
pretation of Tinker, however, requires more subtlety than leaving the decision to govern only
disruptive speech.
426 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969).
427 Id.
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playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he
may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the
conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without materially and substan-
tially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights
of others.428
So with the Court not making a distinction in the origin of the message or its con-
nection to the schools curriculum, a distinction made today is therefore somewhat arti-
ficial. Yet this distinction is critical in determining Tinkers true place after the trifecta
of cases that followed in its wake. Tinker, at its core, permits a student to express
noncurricular speech so long as that speech does not interfere with the workings of
the school. It thus allows for the black armband on the playground, the lunchroom, and
even the classroom. What Tinker does not specifically consider, however, is what hap-
pens when the black armband is worn or discussed in the context of a history or current
events course.
In his Hazelwood dissent, Justice William Brennan attempted to reconcile the
Tinker standard with allowing schools to control student speech in the course of a
schools curriculum. Arguing that the decision in Hazelwood was unnecessary and
that Tinker could have easily resolved the problem at issue, Justice Brennan wrote:
UnderTinker, schoolofficials maycensoronlysuch student speech
as would materially disrup[t] a legitimate curricular function.
Manifestly, student speech is more likely to disrupt a curricular
function when it arises in the context of a curricular activityone
that is designed to teach somethingthan when it arises in the
context of a noncurricular activity. Thus, under Tinker, the school
may constitutionally punish the budding political orator if he dis-
rupts calculus class but not if he holds his tongue for the cafete-
ria. That is not because some more stringent standard applies in
the curricular context. . . . It is because student speech in the non-
curricular context is less likely to disrupt materially any legiti-
mate pedagogical purpose.429
When Justice Brennan noted that student speech is more likely to disrupt a cur-
ricular function when it arises in the context of a curricular activity,430 he was undoubt-
edly correct, but his reasoning fails to account for student speech related to the
428 Id. at 51213 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Burnsidev. Byars, 363
F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
429 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 283 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
430 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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curricular activity. Indeed, as Justice Abe Fortas wrote for the majority in Tinker, Any
departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. . . . Any word spoken, in
class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance.431 But, to borrow Justice
Brennans calculus example, how do we account for the disturbance that comes when
a student accurately notes that his teacher made an error when finding a derivative?
Or, to return to Tinker, how do we analyze the disturbance that arises when a student
voices opposition to the Vietnam War during a 1965 lesson on current events? Further-
more, what happens when a students violent short story, poem, or other creation that
follows all prescribed elements of an assignment emotionally disturbs an English class
or its teacher? Tinker views the presence of a disruption in the school setting as a
binary questioneither there is a disruption (meaning the students speech can be
censored) or there is not a disruption (meaning the student is allowed to speak). Yet
the standard does not consider that in some instances, a disturbance is simply the
natural result of the educational process.
Ultimately, the applicability of Tinker to non-sponsored curricular speech should
be decided by two important points: that (1) Tinker is fundamentally a question of
noncurricular speech and (2) the standards failure to adequately account for what
amounts to a positive disturbance in the learning process. Again, Tinker would be
a wonderful standard in a world where it could be interpreted fairly and consis-
tently,432 and where it existed as the only word from the Supreme Court on the matter
of student speech. But since it has been so eroded by Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse,
it must now be limited in its application to instances where it is fundamentally
appropriatenamely situations of noncurricular speech. Therefore, Tinker should
not be the standard by which cases of violent non-sponsored curricular speech cases
are decided.
431 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
432 See, e.g., Calvert, Tinkers Midlife Crisis, supra note 159, at 1188 (The Tinker test itself
has multiple flaws that harmitseffectiveness and, concomitantly, has led to its misuseand abuse.
As aptly recognized byProfessor Mark Yudof, current president of the UniversityofCalifornia:
When I was a law professor, I used to ask my students the following questions: What counts
as a disruption? How much disruption will outweigh the assertion of the right? How are these
interests balanced? Is this rule, with its emphasis on identifying disruption in schools, a rule
at all, or is it just an invitation to judges to assert their personal ideologies and persuasions?
(footnote omitted)); R. George Wright, Post-Tinker, 10 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 12 (2014)
(A final, largely recently developed limitation on Tinker is the sensible desire to broadly in-
terpret, if not expand, the Tinker disruption prong. While the Tinker standard in general has
been and remains somewhat unclear, the disruption prong does tend to conjure up mental
images of something like an angry hallway confrontation, if not a physical altercation, or threat
thereof. (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 25 (suggesting that at this point in our history,
it is implausible that Tinker, along with its refinements, qualifications, and limitations, amounts
to the only constitutionally permissible approach to student speech, as the public schools
seek to better and more cost-effectively discharge their vital and multi-faceted basic mission).
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D. Why Hazelwood Is Not Controlling
As discussed in the introduction to this Article, Hazelwood would be a logical
fit for these cases aside from its requirement that speech falling under the scope of
the decision be both curricular in nature and sponsored by a school.433 For the cases
discussed in Part II, the ties to curriculum and education are fairly evident in stories
written for class,434 artwork either created for class or commissioned by a teacher,435
a poem submitted to a teacher for critique,436 and a website that had its start with an
in-class writing assignment.437 All of these examples are deeply integrated in the
instructional dutyof the school and are therefore types of speech schools should nurture
and guide as part of their educational missionthus making this speech inherently
curricular. The question of sponsorship, however, is more difficult to answer, but the
most logical solution, after examining Hazelwood, is that sponsorship requires more
than a mere connection to the school. This conclusion, when combined with the obser-
vation that Hazelwood fails to make an adequate distinction between educational and
punitive measures, suggests that Hazelwood cannot properly address the issues sur-
rounding violent non-sponsored student speech.
In Hazelwood, the Court distinguished student speech that a school must tolerate
from student speech that a school must affirmatively . . . promote, with the former
category of speech being governed by Tinker and the latter falling under Hazelwood.438
Speech falling under Hazelwood was further defined as school-sponsored publica-
tions, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents,
433 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 27071 (The question whether the First Amendment
requires a school to tolerate particular student speechthe question that we addressed in
Tinkeris different from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirma-
tively to promote particular student speech. The former question addresses educators ability
to silence a students personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The
latter question concerns educators authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may fairly
be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart
particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.); see also id. at 273
([W]e hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.).
434 E.g., Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 2011); D.F. v. Bd.
ofEduc., 386F. Supp. 2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001).
435 E.g., Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2012); Demers
v. Leominster Sch. Dept., 263 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Mass. 2003); Boman v. Bluestem Unified
Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 200 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389 (D. Kan. Feb. 14, 2000); In re
Ryan D., 100 Cal. App. 4th 854 (2002).
436 E.g., LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
437 E.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
438 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 27071.
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and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school.439 As the Court argued, teachers and administrators had greater authority to
exercise control over this Hazelwood category of curricular speech to assure that
participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of matu-
rity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school.440 But a mere connection to education and learning was not enough to
trigger Hazelwood for the Court, which held that the speech in question must also
be reasonably perceived as bearing the imprimatur of the school.441
Imprimatur, from the Latin for let it be printed, was originally a license re-
quired for publication, and today, it is also defined as [a] general grant of approval.442
Thus the inquiry into whether speech bears the imprimatur of the school seeks to
answer, in essence, whether the student speech at issue might reasonably be perceived
as carrying the official banner of the school.443 With the examples given by the Court
in Hazelwood, the issue of imprimatur seems intuitive, as the Court cites school publi-
cations and theatrical productions as two expressive activities that would naturally
bear the seal of the school.444 Lower courts have also found art installations445 and
commencement speeches446 to be types of student expression that generally bear the
schools imprimaturinstallations because of their fixation to school walls and
speeches because of the vetting and approval processof most commencement speakers.
As the Tenth Circuit concluded in Fleming v. Jefferson County School District, [e]x-
pressive activities that do not bear the imprimatur of the school could include a variety
of activities conducted by outside groups that take place on school facilities after-
school, such as club meetings where expressive activities that the school allows to be
integrated permanentlyinto the schoolenvironment and that students pass byduring the
school day come much closer to reasonably bearing the imprimatur of the school.447
439 Id. at 271.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 825 (10th ed. 2014).
443 See Jordan, supra note 110, at 156061 (2003) ([A] schools promotion of speech intro-
duces the possibility that the expression will be attributed to the school itself. Speech that bears
the imprimatur of the school resembles official speech, leaving the school free to employreason-
able measures to guard against misattribution. (footnote omitted)).
444 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
445 See, e.g., Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208 (11thCir. 2004); Flemingv. JeffersonCnty.
Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002).
446 See, e.g., A.M. ex rel. McKay v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 510 F. Appx 3 (2d Cir.
2013); Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2009).
447 Fleming, 298 F.3d at 925. Fleming is somewhat notable in the context of a discussion
of student speech and the surrounding anxiety regarding school violence as the case stems
fromanart project at Columbine High School after the1999shooting. Id. at 92021. The project
allowed students and community members to paint tiles that would then be installed as part of
the reconstruction process. Id. at 921.
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But where does this leave in-class assignments as far as bearing the imprimatur
of the school? In Settle v. Dickson County School Board,448 the Sixth Circuit upheld
a summary judgment decision in favor of a school district where a student com-
plained that her First Amendment rights were violated when she was not allowed to
write a research paper on The Life of Jesus Christ.449 The majority easily brushed
aside the students claim in favor of broadly affirming a teachers right to assign
grades,450 but in her concurring opinion, Judge Alice M. Batchelder took a more nu-
anced view of the students First Amendment claim.451 As the judge argued, the facts
in Settle could not be made to fit within the framework of cases such as Hazelwood
and Tinker, suggesting that the question of a students speech rights in a curricular
assignment without school sponsorship were a distinctly different issue not answered
by Supreme Court jurisprudence.452 Tinker did not apply, the judge reasoned, be-
cause [a] research paper is not an expression of opinion, and the restriction of choice
of topic is not readily analogous to the kind of pure expression of student opinion, that
happened to take place in the classroom, that the Supreme Court addressed there.453
Similarly, the facts in Settle were different from Hazelwood because there was no
way to make a colorable claim that this paper is speech which might be viewed by the
community as bearing the imprimatur of the school, a determination that Judge
Batchelder argued was central to the Supreme Courts holding in Hazelwood.454
As she further concluded: Certainly not all student speech in the classroom bears
the imprimatur of the school.455
Aside from the questionable proposition that student assignments can even carry
the implicit sign of approval from a school, student speech in such cases is much easier
for a school to disassociate itself from, a point that then-Judge Samuel Alito made in
448 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995).
449 Id. at 153. The case was framed as a matter of student speech instead of a religious claim,
as the court explained: Although this paper topic concerns religious subject matter, the plaintiff
does not bring her case under the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Instead, she has chosen to challenge [the teachers] rejection of her topic as restrict-
ing her rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Id.
450 See id. at 15556 (Teachers may frequently make mistakes in grading and otherwise, just
as we do sometimes in deciding cases, but it is the essence of the teachers responsibility in the
classroom to draw lines and make distinctionsin a word to encourage speech germane to the
topic at hand and discourage speech unlikely to shed light on the subject. Teachers therefore
must be given broad discretion to give grades and conduct class discussion based on the content
of speech. Learning is more vital in the classroom than free speech.); see also id. at 155
(Grades are given as incentives for study, and they are the currency by which school work
is measured.).
451 See id. at 15659 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
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his dissent in C.H. v. Oliva.456 In Oliva, an en banc Third Circuit split and thereby
affirmed a district court decision dismissing a students First Amendment claim after
his Thanksgiving poster was removed from a hall display due to a religious theme.457
In his dissent, Judge Alito argued that nothing in Hazelwood suggests that its stan-
dard applies when a student is called upon to express his or her personal views in class
or in an assignment,458 an observation that again emphasizes the importance of the
imprimatur requirement. Additionally in the case of a student assignment, the danger
to the school of having a students speech misattributed to the administration is much
less because if anyone might have reasonably interpreted the display of [the students]
poster in the hall as an effort by the school to endorse Christianity or religion, the
school could have posted a sign explaining that the children themselves had decided
what to draw.459
Thus, using Alitos logic and the examples cited in Hazelwood, a students assign-
ment is different from a school newspaper or a school play because (1) the assign-
ment does not carry the imprimatur of the school and (2) even if the assignment was
attributable to the school, the administration could easily distance itself from a students
speech. Hazelwood, therefore, would be inapplicable where a student was expressing
a personal opinion during the course of an assignment.460
Still, however, some courts broadly interpret or ignore the imprimatur requirement
or otherwise fail to apply Hazelwood correctly, resulting in a departure from the text
of the decision and an expansion in its application.461 As just one example of this misap-
plication, theSixth Circuit stated in Curry v. Hensiner462 that Hazelwood grants schools
greater latitude to restrict . . . speech where student expression is school-spon-
sored speech, such as a newspaper, or speech made as part of a schools curriculum.463
That either-or proposition is clearly incorrect where the Supreme Court specified that
for Hazelwood to apply, student speech must be both sponsoredin terms of bearing
the schools imprimaturand connected to the schools curriculum.464
If more courts followed a similar interpretation to Hazelwood, then the question of
violent non-sponsored curricular speech would at least have a clear (albeit incorrect)
answer as the curricular nature of the cases discussed in Part I would automatically
bring them under Hazelwood even though the speech in question lacked the impri-
matur of the school. However, as Judge Batchelder astutely noted in Settle, student
456 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000).
457 Id. at 20001. The poster indicated the student was thankful for Jesus. Id. at 201.
458 Id. at 213 (Alito, J., dissenting).
459 Id. at 21213.
460 See id. at 213.
461 See Jordan, supra note 110, at 1569 (arguing that faultyanalysis leads to an increase in the
application of Hazelwood to the detriment of student speech rights).
462 513 F.3d 570 (6th Cir. 2008).
463 Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
464 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 27071 (1988) (explaining the ele-
ments of school-promoted student speech).
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speech as communicated in assignments fall(s) somewhere in between Hazelwood
and Tinker as a form of student expression allowed under the school curriculum but not
sponsored or endorsed by the school.465 But this positioning of non-sponsored curricu-
lar expression as somewhere between Hazelwood and Tinker presupposes a neat and
orderly spectrum of protection for student rights where that is not entirely accurate.
At its inception, the Tinker standard was deployed to address the intersection of
noncurricular speech and noncurricular punishments, meaning responses by school
administrators to student speech that are generally punitive and unrelated to curricu-
lum or education.466 Hazelwood, conversely, examines curricular speech and the cur-
ricular response from a school.467 However, most of the violent non-sponsored
student speech cases examined in this Article represent curricular speech that was
met with a noncurricular response in the form of a punitive suspension or even criminal
charges against a student. Specifically examining the typical response levied against
a student in cases of violent non-sponsored curricular speech, it is therefore difficult
to say that Tinker offers more protection than Hazelwood, especially where the general
application of Tinker results in perfunctory analysis cloaked in the worries of school
violence and deference to school administrators. But that is not to say that an expansion
of Hazelwood would cure all ills in this area. Where courts have found a legitimate
pedagogical concern in avoiding the disruption to the schools learning environ-
ment to justify Hazelwood censorship,468 it is not hard to envision a student suspen-
sion upheld under an expanded Hazelwood as a writer of violent fiction or an artist
creating violent compositions would simply be a distraction and subsequent disrup-
tion in the learning environment. An expansion of Hazelwood, therefore, is unsuitable
for thepurposesof addressing the problem of violent non-sponsored student expression
because it does not expressly protect students against punitive disciplinary measures.
Thus Hazelwood joins the true threat doctrine, Fraser, Morse, and, finally, Tinker
as doctrinalapproaches toviolent non-sponsored curricular speech aspossiblesolutions
that fail to adequately address the First Amendment issues that arise when a student
is disciplined for violent speech that is associated with a schools curriculum but not
reasonably interpreted as coming from the school itself. A new standard, therefore,
465 Settle v. Dickinson Cnty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1995) (Batchelder, J.,
concurring).
466 See Tinkerv.DesMoines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). The students
were not allowed to attend school so long as they were wearing the protest armbands. Id. It
is doubtful this response was designed to teach anything to the students.
467 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 26364. The First Amendment rights of the students in
Hazelwood may have been violated, but their punishment (in that two pages were removed
from the school newspaper) was designed in some way, perhaps, to teach. See id. at 271
(explaining that a school may censor sponsored, curricular speech where it is ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuit-
able for immature audiences).
468 Bannon v. Sch. Dist., 387 F.3d 1208, 1217 (2004) (citing Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty.
Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 918, 934 (10th Cir. 2002)).
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is needed to govern this particular subset of student speecha standard that will be
explained in Part IV.
IV. A STANDARD FOR NON-SPONSORED CURRICULAR SPEECH
This Article proposes the following standard for violent non-sponsored curricu-
lar speech: In instances where non-true threat violent student speech is curricular in
nature and not sponsored by the school, the First Amendment forbids punitive disci-
pline by school administrators. Rather, the only remedies for teachers and adminis-
trators in these cases should be pedagogical and therapeutic counter speech from school
officials designed to teach and counselrather than punishstudents. This Part will
explain the operation of this new standard and examine the many options left to school
administrators when their ability to punitively suspend or even expel students is no
longer constitutional.
As Judge Batchelder speculated in her concurrence in Settle, the First Amendment
protection for a students assignment would necessarily fall between Tinker and
Hazelwood.469 Following this line of analysis, Adam Hoesing argued that such a
standard must fall somewhere between Tinkers full protection and Hazelwoods
rational-basis protection. Thus, some form of intermediate protection, perhaps?470
Again, however, the best possible solution does not necessarily have to fall between
those two decisions in a straight line. Therefore, the proposed standard for violent
non-sponsored curricular speech borrows elements from both decisions. From Tinker,
the standard takes a relatively pro-student approach to school speech as it is built on
the assumption that student First Amendment rights are critical to education471 and the
fostering of a new generation of citizens. Conversely, the standard takes from Hazel-
wood the implicit understanding that schools are a place for education and that admin-
istrators must be in charge of the curriculum and learning.
The operation of the standard is designed to be straightforward. If a school admin-
istrator is presented with apiece of violent non-sponsored curricular student speechas
discussed, this will generally be an assignment in the form of a story, poem, or other
creative workthe administrator may first ascertain whether the work, and by exten-
sion the student, represents a threat. This investigation should be guided by common
sense principles regarding threats: Was the speech communicated directly to the target
of the perceived threat? Was it a conditional threat designed to motivate the recipient?
How specific was the threat? Were there any mitigating elements (such as parody,
hyperbole or sarcasm) to suggest there was no intent to threaten? In short, this is a
highly factual examination designed only as a preliminary step; if it appears to truly
represent a threat, it may be examined using the true threat analysis and then subse-
quently the Tinker doctrine if the speech is constitutionally protected. Either the
469 Settle, 53 F.3d at 158 (Batchelder, J., concurring).
470 Hoesing, supra note 110, at Part IV.
471 But cf. Settle, 53 F.3d at 156 (Learning is more vital in the classroom than free speech.).
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substantive appearance of a true threat472 or the lack of a connection to education
removes the speech in question from this admittedly permissive standard and again
places it in the realm of true threat analysis and Tinker.
If the violent non-sponsored curricular student speech at issue is not a threat, then
the school may deal with it as it sees fit, consistent with the educational principles
contained in Hazelwood. The only limitation on this authority is that the school must
confront curricular speech with a curricular responsei.e., some type of pedagogical
counter speech rather than a strictly disciplinary measure.
This proscription on a disciplinary response is premised on two points. First, the
state should be unable to punish speech that it, in effect, commissioned, as a matter of
fundamental fairness. Second, granting schools Hazelwood authority over speech
not covered bythedecision should come with the implied (but not expressed) restriction
to a curricular response contained in the decision. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
illustrated the natural tension in using Hazelwood to discipline students:
[S]chools may discipline student speech that is, for example, un-
grammatical, poorly written, or inadequately researched. While
few people likely question this authority, it is important to note
that even this type of disciplinebe it correcting a typographical
error, having a student rewrite a particular assignment, or the
likeinfringes to some extent upon otherwise protected speech.
Nevertheless, when examined in light of the special characteris-
tics of the school environment, this speech, like speech that more
dramatically interferes with a schools educational mission, may
be disciplined without contravening the First Amendment.473
Correcting student speech that is ungrammatical, poorly written, or inadequately
researched is simply a function of teaching; it is not discipline as the court framed
it. Discipline is punitive, and there is little punitive intent behind a teachers red ink.
As Jonathan Pyle noted: Detention and suspension are unusual repercussions for
failure to recite the Gettysburg Address correctly. The educational process would
not seriouslybe harmed if teachers were constrained to teach subject matter with grades
and maintain order with the discipline code.474 Hazelwood is premised on the notion
of education rather than punitive discipline, and therefore, anysimilar curricular speech
standard must reflect this fundamental reality.
472 The natural inclination of many in the school setting will be to read true threats into ex-
pression where they may not be present. However, a students intent should be at the forefront
of this consideration. See supra notes 38291 (explaining a plausible situation where a student
assignment may be a true threat).
473 In re Douglas D., 626 N.W.2d 725, 743 n.17 (Wis. 2001) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
474 Pyle, supra note 156, at 610.
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So if a school cannot suspend, expel, or otherwise punitively react to violent non-
sponsored curricular speech, what can it do? In short, a school can engage in any peda-
gogical or therapeutic counter speech that it finds necessary to address the situation.
Generally, counter speech is the idea that whenever speech is feared for its potential
negative effects, the proper solution is not to silence the speech but to respond to it
with more speech.475 In the school setting, if violent student speech is feared, then
the proper constitutional response is to reply to that speech with the best pedagogical
counter speech tool available: a grade. As the Sixth Circuit stated in Settle, [g]rades
are given as incentives for study, and they are the currency by which school work
is measured.476 Therefore, if teachers and administrators find a students assignment
to be impermissibly violent, then the school should simply assign a grade that
reflects that displeasure. Under such an outcome, the school is allowed to voice its
opinion of the impropriety of violent expression in the school setting, and the student
is given an opportunity to learn that expression often has consequences.
However, in some instances a school may not wish to reflect its displeasure with
a grade or it may be unable to do so in those situations where the student expression
at issue is not a formalized assignment.477 In those cases, a school can still counsel a
student without the formal structure of the grading process. In LaVine, for example,
a students violent poem was given to his teacher for evaluation outside of the formal
curriculum of the school.478 Instead of punishing the student with an emergency
expulsion,479 the teacher and other school officials could have told the student that,
while violence is often commonplace in poetry and art, the inclusion of a school
shooting fantasy into a poem is inappropriate where students, teachers, and other
members of the school community are generally afraid of school violence. Further-
more, the school administrators could have prompted the student to seek counseling
or other help for his emotional state. In essence, they could have acted as educators
and leaders and taught the students they sought to punish.
475 See Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Censorship of the
Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 243, 28586 (2001) (discussing
the doctrine of counter speech).
476 Settle, 53 F.3d at 155.
477 See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (where the
student speech was a website inspired by course assignments); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257
F.3d 981 (9thCir. 2001) (where the student speechwas a poemgiven to a teacher for evaluation).
478 LaVine, 257 F.3d at 984.
479 See id. at 983 (Although this is a close case in retrospect, we conclude that when the
school officialsexpelled [the student] theyacted withsufficient justificationand within constitu-
tional limits, not to punish [the student] for the content of his poem, but to avert perceived poten-
tial harm.). As per this exigency, the student missed a total of seventeen days of class. Id. at 986.
It is difficult to say for certain how long it takes to determine whether a student is a threat, but
a seventeen-day suspension is presumptively punitive rather than precautionary. Cf. Cox v.
Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2011) (where a student was
determined to not be a threat in a single day).
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Violent student speech may indeed be inherently unsettling in the school environ-
ment, but the answer to this dilemma should never be a punitive response. Where vio-
lent student speech is curricular in nature, both its ties to education and the First
Amendment should insulate that speech from a purely disciplinary response. There
is no constitutional right implicated, however, where a school responds to violent cur-
ricular student speech with a failing grade. Indeed, if schools are to teach by example
the shared values of a civilized social order480 by instructing students that violent
imagery has no place in the post-Columbine American school, then grades are the most
effective and appropriate tool with which to truly teach such a lesson.
CONCLUSION
If Part IVs standard for violent non-sponsored curricular speech was applied to the
previously discussed cases, many of the decisions would see a reversal in favor of
student plaintiffs. LaVine would certainly be such a reversal as it is difficult to argue
how a seventeen-day emergency expulsion is anything but a punitive response to
student curricular speech.481 Similarly in Cuff, a five-day suspension was certainly
punitive where the school did not attempt to ascertain whether the students astro-
naut drawing represented a threat, as such a failure to investigate represents a tacit
acknowledgement that the students speech was mere creative expression in the
course of a school assignment.482
Cox, however, represents a course of action taken by school administrators that
would be fully upheld under the new standard. When a teacher was concerned about a
students casual description of illegal activity, violence, and suicide in an assign-
ment for class, the teacher passed her concerns along to the principal, who then took the
student into an in-school suspension room while the principal considered whether
[the student] posed an imminent threat to himself or others, and whether he should
be disciplined for his essay.483 After the principal decided the student was not a threat,
he was returned to class, and the matter was over.484
The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment includes both pro-
tections for speech and the right to refrain from speaking at all.485 But that insula-
tion from the dangers of compelled speech does not translate well to a classroom setting
where students are required tocomplete assignments, resulting in a fundamental unfair-
ness when students are disciplined as a result of their coursework. Using disciplinary
480 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
481 See supra notes 47779 and accompanying text (discussing LaVine, 257 F.3d 981).
482 See Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Cent. Valley Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 11112 (2d Cir. 2012).
483 Cox, 654 F.3d at 27071.
484 Id. at 271. The school additionallyplaced a call to the NewYork Department of Child and
FamilyServices. Id. Thisdecision, while perhaps unnecessary, represented truecareand concern
for the student.
485 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
2015] NEITHER TINKER, HAZELWOOD, FRASER, NOR MORSE 855
measures to punish violent student speech is not only inconsistent with some of the
fundamental principles of education, but it is also incompatible with the logical reality
of the school setting. If the student suspensions discussed in this Article were premised
on protecting members of the school community, there are two important faults with
that reasoning. The first is that discipline applied in this setting could have a chilling
effect on other students who might seek to express themselves using violent imag-
ery. If the concept of leakagemeaning that students who seek to harm others often
detail their plans before an episode of violenceis to be believed, then chilling violent
student speech would only suppress potential warnings of an attack. The second
logical problem with this application of discipline is that, as Richard Salgado wrote,
[e]xpelling or suspending a student does not preclude the student from returning
to campus with a loaded gun.486 School discipline in these cases is simply not making
any school any safer.
The cases discussed in this Articlemayrepresent examples ofspeech with marginal
independent value, but that value becomes magnified when violent speech is used by
a student in the process of education. These cases, in essence, matter, and they matter
despite our squeamishness with the idea of school violence; they matter because
education and the First Amendment matter. As a dissenting Circuit Court judge in
Cuff argued,
While the concept of irony may seem well beyond the ken of
an average ten-year-old, young children routinely experiment with
the seeds of satire. They learn by fumbling their way to finding
the boundaries between socially permissible, and even encour-
aged, forms of expression that employ exaggeration for rhetori-
cal effect, and impermissible and offensive remarks that merely
threaten and alienate those around them.
This young boys drawing was clearly not some subtle, ironic
jab at his school or broader commentary about education. It was
a crude joke. But the First Amendment should make us hesitate
beforesilencingstudents whoexperimentwith hyperbole forcomic
effect, however unknowing and unskillful that experimentation
may be.487
486 Salgado, supra note 9, at 1412.
487 Cuff, 677 F.3d at 124 (Pooler, J., dissenting).

